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Abstract
Cutting a cake is a metaphor for the problem of dividing a resource (cake) among several agents.
The problem becomes non-trivial when the agents have different valuations for different parts of
the cake (i.e. one agent may like chocolate while the other may like cream). A fair division of
the cake is one that takes into account the individual valuations of agents and partitions the cake
based on some fairness criterion. Fair division may be accomplished in a distributed or centralized
way. Due to its natural and practical appeal, it has been a subject of study in economics. To best
of our knowledge the role of partial information in fair division has not been studied so far from
an information theoretic perspective. Given the diversity of problems in fair division, we consider
certain specific (yet important) problems that capture different aspects of information exchange in a
fair division setting. From the class of distributed algorithms, we consider the classical Divide and
Choose (DC) problem between two parties. Here, we study the effect of partial spying and voluntarily
sharing of information in both one-shot and asymptotic scenarios. Furthermore, we consider implicit
information transmission through actions for the repeated version of the problem. While identifying
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in repeated games with incomplete information on both sides is
very difficult in general, for the special case of division of two items, we find a more stringent trembling
hand perfect equilibrium. Next, from the class of centralized algorithms, we consider the Adjusted
Winner (AW) algorithm between two players Alice and Bob. Brams and Taylor showed that if Alice
can fully spy on Bob, she can trick the algorithm. We consider the same setup when partial spying is
allowed, and study the growth rate of Alice’s utility per spying bit. Via a transformation from AW to
DC, it is shown that the problem reduces to the one studied earlier for DC. However, if Alice is forced
to only spy certain simple structured functions of Bob’s valuation, an upper bound on the growth rate
of utility per spying bit is derived. This bound is shown to be tight in some cases. We also consider
a centralized algorithm for maximizing the overall welfare of the agents under the Nash collective
utility function (CUF). This corresponds to a clustering problem. By observing a link between this
problem and the portfolio selection problem in stock markets, we provide an upper bound on the
increase of the Nash CUF for a clustering refinement.
1 Introduction
In many applications a number of parties are interested in possessing a limited resource, e.g. a set of
goods or metaphorically a cake.1 Each of the parties has his own valuation of different parts of the cake,
and each has full, partial or no information about the valuation of the other parties. Finding a way
to divide a cake fairly has attracted the attention of economists and mathematicians for a long time.
Although information theory is developed for studying communication systems [4], it gives us tools to
quantify information in other fields (such as fair-division) where partial information is of relevance. For
instance consider a division game between Alice and Bob where Bob is unwilling to let Alice spy on his
information (as that information can be advantageous for Alice, since it would reduce her uncertainty
about Bob’s actions). One of the results of this paper is to show that there are cases where if Bob learns
that the spying rate of Alice exceeds a certain threshold, he will become willing to voluntarily share even
more information with Alice. Thus, identifying when this happens can be of importance to Alice and
Bob in designing the rules of the game.
∗This paper has been presented in part at Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2012.
1For instance, in networking and wireless communications, optimal power allocation is a challenge e.g. see [1, 2, 3].
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1.1 Fair Division
In this paper we assume that the reader is familiar with network information theory but not necessarily
with fair division. Before trying to find a fair division, one must define the term “fairness”. Several criteria
of fairness have been introduced to judge the goodness of a division where none of which subsumes the
others [5]. Here we will give a brief introduction to four of them. Assume that k denotes the number of
parties.
• A division is said to be proportional if each party receives at least 1/k of the entire cake w.r.t. his
own valuation.
• A division is said to be equitable if the piece of the cake each party obtains w.r.t. his own valuation
is exactly equal to what the other parties receive (w.r.t. their own valuation).
• A division is said to be envy-free if no party believes that, w.r.t. his own valuation, the piece another
party has received is more valuable than his own.
• A division is said to be efficient or Pareto optimal if it is not possible to find another division that
increases the gain of every individual.
In the literature of fair division, there are two major assumptions regarding the set of goods to be
divided: the category of divisible goods where each good or item could be divided among parties, and the
category of indivisible goods where each item should wholly be given to one party (e.g. a car or a laptop)
[6]. Analyzing division of divisible goods is generally easier than that of indivisible goods. In the most
generic scenario some of the items may be divisible, some indivisible and some partially divisible. We take
care of this generic scenario by considering a set D of “admissible” divisions of the resource. Theoretically
the set D is of size infinity if we have a divisible item in the resource (since we can cut that item in any
proportion). Practically speaking, even divisible items can be cut up to a certain precision. Therefore
for simplicity we assume that the set D is finite (unless stated otherwise). Lastly, the preferences or
valuations of parties could be ordinal or cardinal. Here we assume that valuations are cardinal, i.e. could
be modeled by non-negative real numbers.
Any algorithm providing a fair division may satisfy one or some of the fairness conditions introduced
above (see for instance [7, 8] for conflicts in fairness criteria and tradeoffs). From another point of view,
fair division may be accomplished in a distributed or centralized way. In a distributed algorithm the
individuals should divide the cake amongst themselves, while in a centralized one, an external referee
divides the cake for them. In order to address these two categories, we have chosen two prominent
algorithms from the field, Divide-and-Choose (DC) from the category of distributed algorithms and
Adjusted Winner (AW) from the category of centralized algorithms. In our discussion of centralized
algorithms, we also consider the problem of optimizing social welfare, another topic in fair division.
The “I cut, you choose” or divide-and-choose (DC) procedure is a well-known and ancient algorithm
for dividing a resource among two parties [5]. The story of dividing a land between Abram and Lot in the
Hebrew Bible refers to this method. In this procedure, the first party (Alice) cuts the cake into two parts
and the second party (Bob) chooses one of the pieces, leaving the other piece for the first party. Note
that Bob has an advantage over Alice for he can choose the best piece and can possibly get even more
than half of the total value he assigns to the cake. In other words, when Alice does not know anything
about Bob’s valuation, she should divide the cake into two parts which are equal with respect to her
valuation, so that despite Bob’s choice, she gains at least half of the cake. However Bob achieves more
than half of the cake since he is free to choose. Since each party can obtain at least half the cake, this
method is proportional but not equitable [9].
The “Adjusted Winner” (AW) algorithm was originally proposed by Brams and Taylor [5]. Since
then, it has been applied to disputes ranging from interpersonal to international [5, 10]. Assume that
two parties, say Alice and Bob, want to divide a set of m divisible goods. Alice’s valuation vector is
denoted by a vector a = (a1, . . . , am) of m non-negative real numbers that add up to one. Similarly,
Bob’s valuation vector is denoted by b = (b1, . . . , bm). We assume that the value of a piece of cake for
each player is the sum of the portion of each item present in that piece times the value that player assigns
to that item. In the Adjusted Winner algorithm Alice and Bob announce their valuations vectors to an
external referee. The referee solves a set of equations to come up with a division of the items which
is proportional, equitable, envy-free and efficient. For extensions of AW to three players or more, see
[11, 5, 12]
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Related to centralized algorithms in fair division is the problem of optimizing the social welfare by
proper division of resources across a society. In the literature of economics, a social welfare is a function
that collects the utilities or gains of each individual in the society and returns a real value which reflects
the overall welfare in the society. Philosophical utilitarianism suggests a division strategy that maximizes
the overall happiness (or sum of the gains of the individuals). Thus, the rules of division here are not
decided by selfish players but by an external judge (or by players who follow Rawls’s veil of ignorance
[13]). Another measure for social welfare that cares not only about the overall happiness but also about
its uniform distribution over the individuals (an egalitarian philosophy) is the Nash collective utility
function (CUF). Nash CUF is defined to be product of the gains of the individuals [14].
We refer the reader to [5, 6, 15] for further reading on fair division.
1.2 Motivation: utility per information bit
To the best of our knowledge, the problem of fair division has only been analyzed when individuals do
not know the valuation of others, or when they have complete information about the valuations; it is not
analyzed in the case of partial information. To motivate this study, let us begin with the DC algorithm.
As we saw previously, the second party, Bob, has advantage in choosing the piece he likes more. One way
to make the algorithm more fair is to provide Alice with partial information about Bob’s valuation. For
instance if there is an item that Alice likes a lot but Bob is indifferent to it - and Alice knows this - she
can put all of it in the piece that she predicts Bob will not choose. To quantize the role of information in
such scenarios, we need to find the gain of individuals as a function of the rate of communication between
them. This leads to characterizing an achievable rate-gain region. The tradeoff between the disadvantage
of being the cutter and the advantage of having information is most notably present in a seller-consumer
scenario. A seller offers a good for a price, and the consumer can choose to buy the item or keep his
money. This problem resembles the DC algorithm and our formulation (defined later) is general enough
to cover it. Setting a price by the seller resembles cutting a cake, and the consumer’s choice of buying
the item is like picking one of the two pieces “item” or “his money”. As discussed above this transaction
scheme is naturally biased towards the chooser, i.e. the consumer. But the seller has generally more
information about the consumer’s needs than the consumer has about the true price of the item. The
role of information in the bargaining dynamic is also colorful: the consumer hides how much he really
needs the item while the seller hides how much the item is really worth.
1.3 Our Contributions
Given the diversity of problems in fair division, we consider certain specific (yet important) problems that
capture different aspects of information exchange in a fair division setting. From the class of distributed
algorithms, we consider the divide and choose problem between two parties. From the class of centralized
algorithms, we consider the adjusted winner and the problem of optimizing the social welfare.
Divide and choose: In the literature of fair division, only one-shot of the divide and choose problem
is considered. However we consider both the one-shot and repeated divide and choose problems. In the
repeated version, the divide and choose procedure is repeated n times on n identical cakes. Then, the
average gain of each party is considered during n games. As was discussed before, parties are unaware of
each other’s valuations. However, they can achieve some amount of side information about the valuation
of the other party which can help them achieve a better result. This flow of information and its impact
on the result of the game is our main interest.
We take three rather different models for this problem in the subsequent sections. In our first model,
we assume that Alice can spy on Bob prior to the division procedure. We call this the spying model.
We consider both the one-shot and asymptotic cases. In the asymptotic case, we assume that parties’
valuations are generated i.i.d. from a given probability distribution. The second model is a game and
information theoretic one, where Bob chooses to communicate only when he expects the information to
increase his gain in the divide and choose procedure. Thus, Bob can share information of his choice (at
limited rate) to Alice prior to the division procedure. We call this the sharing model. In the third model,
which is more game theoretic, we assume that instead of sharing or spying prior to the divide and choose
procedure, information is flowed implicitly during the game. More precisely, rather than gaining explicit
information before cutting the cake, parties receive information about each other’s valuations through
their actions. The main difference between this model and the previous ones is that the valuations are
randomly generated from a given probability distribution once and for all, and are fixed during the n
3
stage game. Therefore, unlike the first model where different stages of the game were independent, parties
can gain information by looking at the history of the game. As a result, for instance Bob might have the
tendency to hide his valuation by choosing the less valuable piece at one stage in order to deceive Alice
and gain more during the next stages. We will explicitly identify a Trembling hand Nash equilibrium
in the resulting repeated game. Trembling hand Nash equilibrium is one of the most strict forms of
equilibrium; for example, it implies the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. While repeated games are
widely studied in game theory (e.g. see [16]), explicit identification of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in repeated games with incomplete information on both sides is known to be very difficult in general.
We show that Bob playing selfishly is an equilibrium and there is no incentive for him not to use his
information initially, so that Alice does not learn about his valuation. Implicit communication through
actions has also been studied in the information theory and control literature (e.g. see [17, 18]). But
these works do not consider game equilibriums.
Adjusted Winner: Brams and Taylor showed that in the case of having two goods, i.e. m = 2, when
one of the parties, say Alice, knows Bob’s valuation while Bob is unaware of this, Alice can announce
an untrue valuation in order to trick the procedure and gain more than what she otherwise would. We
consider the same setup for the general m goods, but with the further refinement of assuming that Alice is
only partially spying on Bob. It is shown that this problem reduces to the corresponding spying problem
in the divide and choose problem. Next, if Alice is only allowed to spy binary questions of the form “Is
Bob’s valuation of a certain good less than a threshold?,” we prove an upper bound on the growth rate
of Alice’s utility per the number of bits she has spied for the case of m = 2. This bound is shown to be
tight for a range of parameters.
Maximizing social welfare: The last part of this paper provides a connection information theory
and optimizing the social welfare under the Nash CUF in fair division in large societies, which is a
clustering problem. This link provides an upper bound on the increase of the Nash CUF for a clustering
refinement.
1.4 Notation and organization of the paper
All the logarithms are in base two throughout this paper. Also [a : b] for natural numbers a and b denotes
the set {a, a+ 1, a+ 2, · · · , b}. We will also need the following definition:
Definition 1. For a pmf pX,Y , the information density ıp(x; y) is defined by
ıp(x; y) := log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
.
Markov chains are denoted by X → Y → Z, meaning that p(x, y, z) = p(x)p(y|x)p(z|y).
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we study the divide and choose problem. In Section
3, we consider the adjusted winner algorithm and finally in Section 4, we consider the Nash Collective
Utility social welfare function. Proofs are given in the subsequent sections.
2 Divide and Choose
We assume that the value each player gives to different pieces of the cake is a random variable on the
set of possible values V which is assumed to be finite. We have no specific assumption over V, but for
having an intuition, one can consider the following special case. Imagine the cake has m items: chocolate,
cream, cherry,· · · . In this particular example, a valuation vector v is a vector of size m, (v1, . . . , vm),
whose indices are nonnegative real numbers adding up to one. The indices indicate interest in individual
items. Thus if a certain piece of the cake has portion αi of item i, the value associated to this piece w.r.t.
v is
∑m
i=1 αivi. However it should be noted that in the general case, we do not assume that valuations
are vectors. We also assume that D, the set of admissible divisions or admissible cuts, is finite. The gain
of each player is a deterministic function of the valuations and the particular division d ∈ D. This is
formalized in the following definition:
Definition 2. Assume that vA and vB are the valuations of Alice and Bob respectively and Alice has
divided the cake by d ∈ D. Then GA (d, vA‖vB) and GB (d, vA‖vB) denote the gain of Alice and Bob
respectively in one game. We assume that VA and VB are generated from the joint distribution q(vA, vB),
which is revealed to both Alice and Bob. The alphabet sets for these random variables are VA = VB = V.
4
2.1 Spying: one-shot
Assume that we are playing one instance of the divide and choose problem. Alice spies on Bob via
a (possibly stochastic) spying function ϕ : VB 7→ M, and a (possibly stochastic) cutting function ψ :
M× VB 7→ D. We assume that M = [1 : M] is the alphabet set of spying information M and logM is
the number of spying bits.
Theorem 1 (One shot). Given any q(u, d|vA, vB) = q(u|vB)q(d|u, vA), there is a spying strategy of a
message in [1 : M] in which the gain of Alice after spying is bounded from below by
EUDVAVB
[ 1
1− J−1 + J−12ıq(VB ;U)
1
1 + (J− 1)M−12−ıq(VA;U)GA (D,VA‖VB)
]
(1)
where J is any natural number, expectation is with respect to q(u|vB)q(d|u, vA)q(vA, vB), and the infor-
mation densities are defined as in Definition 1. The corresponding gain of Bob would be greater than or
equal to
EUDVAVB
[ 1
1 + J−12ıq(VB ;U)
1
1 + JM−12−ıq(VA;U)
GB (D,VA‖VB)
]
, (2)
Moreover, loosening the bounds given in equation (2) gives the following lower bound on Alice’s gain
(1− 3× 2−γ)E[GA (D,VA‖VB) ]− g¯(1− 3× 2−γ)Prob[{log J− ı(VB ;U) ≥ γ, or ı(VA;U)− log(JM−1) ≥ γ}],
where γ is any positive number and g¯ = maxd,vA,vB GA (d, vA‖vB). A similar statement holds for Bob’s
gain.
The proof can be found in Section 5.1.
Remark 1. The form of loosened bound makes it amenable to finite blocklength by setting γ of order
log(n). Let us bound the equation (2) from below as follows:
EUDVAVB
[ 1
1 + J−12ıq(VB ;U)
1
1 + JM−12−ıq(VA;U)
GA (D,VA‖VB)
]
(3)
The first term in the denominator, 1 + J−12ıq(VB ;U) corresponds to a covering lemma in the asymptotic
case, while the second term 1 + JM−12−ıq(VA;U) corresponds to a packing lemma. Next, consider the
special case of J = 1 in the above bound. Then, the bound becomes
EUDVAVB
[ 1
2ıq(VB ;U)
GA (D,VA‖VB)
]
= EUDVAVB
[q(VB)q(U)
q(VB ;U)
GA (D,VA‖VB)
]
= Eq(u)q(vAvB)q(d|uvAvB)
[GA (D,VA‖VB) ]
is the payoff that could be achieved without any communication and U being Alice’s private randomness.
2.2 Spying: asymptotics
Consider n i.i.d. repetitions of the game and consider the average gain over these games. Valuations of
Alice and Bob over the n games are denoted by two sequences of length n, V nA for Alice and V
n
B for Bob.
These two sequences are independently and identically generated from the joint distribution q(vA, vB).
Let R denotes the spying rate per game from Bob to Alice, i.e. it is equal to the total number of bits
spied from Bob divided by n. The formal definition of an n-game code is in order.
Definition 3. An n-game (n,R) code consists of communication variables C with encoder p(c|vnB) as
well as a division strategy p(dn|vnA, c) where 1nH(C) ≤ R. The gains associated with this code are random
variables
G˜A =
1
n
n∑
i=1
GA (Di, VA,i‖VB,i) ,
G˜B =
1
n
n∑
i=1
GB (Di, VA,i‖VB,i) .
(4)
The division Dn over n games is then performed by Alice based on the information she has: spying
information C and her own preferences V nA .
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Definition 4. A (R,GA, GB) rate gain tuple is said to be achievable if for any δ > 0 and N , there exists
a (n,R) code with n > N where the associated gains G˜A and G˜B satisfy the following inequalities with
probability at least 1− δ:
|G˜A −GA| < δ |G˜B −GB | < δ. (5)
Definition 5. The spying rate gain region is the closure of all achievable tuples
(R,GA, GB) and is denoted by R.
There are two relaxations in our formulation in this part compared to the traditional fair division
setup. Firstly the number of games n is allowed to converge to infinity (it is not a one-shot result).
Secondly we are not following the maximin rule (i.e. maximizing the minimum gain) with probability
one. Instead we are relaxing this by requiring a guarantee with probability 1 − δ where δ converges to
zero only after n converges to infinity.
We have
Theorem 2. The set R is the closure of all rate gain tuples (R,GA, GB) such that
R > I(VB ;U |VA),
E [GA (D,VA‖VB)] = GA,
E [GB (D,VA‖VB)] = GB ,
(6)
for some (U,D) satisfying the Markov chain relations
VA → VB → U,
VB → VA, U → D,
(7)
and random variable D taking values on the set of all divisions D.
This achievability part of this theorem follows the one-shot result given in Theorem 1. Alternatively,
it follows from a result on empirical coordination. This proof is given in Section 5.2.
2.2.1 Spying rate and equitability
In a practical scenario it is quite reasonable to assume that Alice uses the information selfishly in order
to maximize her gain. Therefore we can define the selfish gain GselA (R) to be the maximum gain Alice
can obtain limiting the communication rate to a value R, i.e.
GselA = max
(R,GA,GB)∈R
GA.
Bob always chooses the piece he likes more with no concern about Alice’s gain. Let GselB (R) denote the
gain associated with Bob in this case. Since we want to study the equitability of the division (a fairness
criterion discussed at the beginning of the introduction), we define the difference between these two gains
as
∆sel(R) = GselB (R)−GselA (R). (8)
A spying rate R results in an equitable division if ∆sel(R) = 0.
To illustrate several aspects of the result, we consider a few examples. Imagine the cake has only
two items, say cream and chocolate, and the set of possible valuations is V = { , } where denotes
complete interest in cream and no interest in chocolate, i.e. = (1, 0) while = (0, 1) denotes complete
interest in chocolate. Assume the cake is half cream and half chocolate and the set of possible divisions is
D = { , } where means dividing the cake so that in each piece we have half cream and half chocolate
and means dividing the cake so that one piece is full cream and one is full chocolate. Assume that the
joint distribution over valuations, p(vA, vB) is as p( , ) = p( , ) = 2/6 and p( , ) = p( , ) = 1/6.
For a fixed R, the set of achievable gain pairs (GA, GB) form a region in R2 which is illustrated in
Figure 1a for different values of R. Figures 1b, 1c and 1d respectively show the values of GselA , G
sel
B and
∆sel as functions of R for our example. As we see, Alice’s spying gain always increases with the rate;
which is expected, since she can use or ignore the extra spying information. However, the interesting
observation is that Bob’s gain increases up to some value for small rates and then decreases. This means
that up to a point, sharing information is advantageous for both sides. The other point is that the value
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of the rate of communication R.
Figure 1: Our first example of explicit information transmission in Divide and Choose
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Figure 2: GselB and the rate region for the probability distribution (9)
of ∆sel is zero only when R = 0 and R ≥ H(VB |VA), this suggests that the division is equitable just in
case of zero information or full information. The reason for this is that in this example, the divisions are
so that Bob’s gain is always greater or equal than that of Alice. In other words for any vA, vB ∈ V and
d ∈ D, GB (d, vA‖vB) ≥ GA (d, vA‖vB), therefore we always have GB ≥ GA.
However, other behaviors can be observed when changing V, D and the joint probability. For instance,
by keeping V and D unchanged, but changing the joint probability distribution as
p( , ) =
1
14
, p( , ) =
6
14
,
p( , ) =
5
14
, p( , ) =
2
14
.
(9)
We observe that Bob’s gain, GselB (R), initially decreases and then increases slightly, as depicted in Fig-
ure 2b. In this example, unlike the latter one, it is more probable that the two players have different
valuations, therefore in the case of zero information, it is more beneficiary for Alice to divide the cake by
which results in a gain of 1 for Bob. The rate gain region for this example is illustrated in Figure 2a.
As mentioned before, Bob’s gain will be always greater than or equal to Alice’s for the choice of
D = { , }. Now, we change the setup to,
V = { , },
D = { , },
p( , ) =
1
6
p( , ) =
2
6
,
p( , ) =
2
6
p( , ) =
1
6
,
(10)
where means 2/3 interest in chocolate and 1/3 interest in cream, means 1/3 interest in chocolate
and 2/3 interest in cream, means dividing in a way so that in one piece we have all chocolate and
3/16 of the whole cream and denotes dividing in a way so that in one piece we have all the cream and
3/16 chocolate. In this case, Figures 3a, 3b and 3c show GselA , G
sel
B and ∆
sel respectively as a functions
of R. As we see for a rate Req, ∆
sel(Req) = 0 which shows that with the information rate of Req, the
division is equitable, while for information rate less than that amount, Bob has advantage and with more
information rate, Alice has advantage. In fact, this value of information makes an equilibrium between the
natural advantage of Bob over Alice and the information Alice gains about Bob’s valuations. Figure 3d
shows that the rate region for this example is a part of a line in the plane for all values of R.
Another interesting fact could be observed by changing the probability distribution of (10) into
V = { , },
D = { , },
p( , ) =
1
19
p( , ) =
9
19
,
p( , ) =
2
19
p( , ) =
7
19
.
(11)
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As we can see in Figure 4a, Bob’s gain first increases, then decreases and then increases again. The region
of this setup is depicted in Figure 4b. This together with our latter observations suggest that Bob’s gain
does not have an specific behavior in general.
2.3 Information sharing
Let us consider the following problem: assume that there is a one-way communication link of limited rate
R from player B to player A. Unlike the previous problem, player B makes a decision as to whether com-
municate any information to player A (instead of player A spying on player B by choosing the information
that will be communicated by player B). Player B can potentially benefit himself by communicating clev-
erly (yet honestly) to player A who will make the cut. The choice of communication protocol then serves
the role of the strategy of the player. This brings in a game aspect to the problem.
Assume that Alice and Bob are playing the game on n i.i.d. repetitions of the divide and choose game,
i.e. q(vnA, v
n
B) =
∏n
i=1 q(vAi, vBi). The two parties have also possibly access to a shared randomness S
taking values in a finite set S. The amount of the shared randomness can be arbitrary, but fixed before
the game starts. The strategy of Bob is q(c|vnB , s) where c is the message on the alphabet set [1 : 2nR]
and S is a shared randomness between the two parties (independent of (V nA , V
n
B )). Alice’s strategy is
q(dn|vnA, c, s) where di is the division by Alice in i-th game. Alice’s payoff is the sum of the expected
value of her payoff over the n games (after Bob picking his most favorable part in each game).
Observe that Bob may choose not to use the shared randomness by setting q(c|vnB , s) = q(c|vnB). Also,
when there is no communication between Alice and Bob, existence (or lack thereof) of shared randomness
is not important in the set of gain pairs they can achieve.
Observe that the cut and choose game is not a zero-sum game, and hence there is no unique Nash
equilibrium payoff. There may be many different optimal ways for Alice to cut the cake; different optimal
ways of cutting the cake that are all the same from the perspective of Alice, but can affect Bob’s average
payoff. Fixing any of one these cutting strategies for Alice, she will not have any incentive for changing
her strategy. Therefore, each of these strategies lead to an equilibrium.
To state our main result, let us make the following definition, which considers the equilibriums in the
one-shot instance of the problem with no communication:
Definition 6. Given q(vA, vB) with no communication from Bob to Alice, we define a set G(q(vA, vB))
as the set of average gain pairs (GA, GB) that could be achieved assuming that Alice is playing optimal
and selfish in a single instance of the game (n = 1). Since Alice may have several optimal ways to cut
the cake, the set G(q(vA, vB)) can have more than one point.
Observe that if (GA, GB) and (G
′
A, G
′
B) are in G(q(vA, vB)), we must have GA = G
′
A by definition of
optimality for Alice. Furthermore, G(q(vA, vB)) is convex since Alice can randomize between two optimal
cutting strategies. Thus, G(q(vA, vB)) can be expressed a set of pairs of the form (GA(q(vA, vB)), GB)
for some GB,l(q(vA, vB)) ≤ GB ≤ GB,u(q(vA, vB)).
Let us now characterize a set of -equilibriums, wherein any change of strategy by Alice and Bob will
not increase their payoff by more than .
Theorem 3. For any p(vA, vB), fix some pair (GA(p(vA, vB)), G
∗
B(p(vA, vB))) ∈ G(p(vA, vB)). Let
GBmax(q(vA, vB)) = max
q(c|vB):I(C;VB)≤R
∑
c
q(c)G∗B(q(vA, vB |c)),
where q(c, vA, vB) = q(c|vB)q(vA, vB). Let q(c|vB) be any arbitrary maximizer of GBmax. Then, given
any  > 0, for sufficiently large n, one can find a shared randomness assisted strategy for players A and
B with communication of rate R such that (i) the strategies form an -equilibrium, (ii) the corresponding
payoff pair is coordinatewise within  distance of(∑
c
q(c)GA(q(vA, vB |c)), GBmax
)
. (12)
Proof of this theorem can be found in Section 5.3.
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2.4 Implicit Information Transmission
In this part we assume that Alice’s and Bob’s valuations are generated from a given probability distri-
bution q(vA, vB) once and for all and will remain fixed during the subsequent n stage game. Alice’s
and Bob’s valuations are chosen from VA and VB , respectively, which are the set of their permissible
valuations.
As depicted in Fig. 5, we assume that Alice has two possible actions at each steps: she can either
choose to play risky (denoted by R) or non-risky (denoted by NR). If she plays non-risky, then independent
of Bob’s valuation, both parties receive exactly half the cake, i.e. playing non-risky is equivalent to cutting
the cake into two pieces which worth exactly 1/2 with respect to any possible valuation of Alice and Bob.
Therefore the two pieces have exactly the same value for both players, and without loss of generality
we do not consider any action for Bob. On the other hand, if Alice chooses the action R, then Bob can
choose the left piece (action L) or the right piece (action R). If Bob plays L, then Alice receives a gain
of GA and Bob receives GB where GA is a function of Alice’s valuation and GB is a function of Bob’s
valuation. Since the whole cake has a gain of 1 for both parties, if Bob chooses R, then Alice and Bob
receive 1−GA and 1−GB , respectively. We shall assume that
GA 6= 1/2 GB 6= 1/2
If two different valuations of vA, vB result in the same values for GA and GB , then in the sense of strategies
and equilibriums these two valuations are identical. Therefore in the following discussion we shall forget
about valuations and instead assume that there is a joint distribution
p(gA, gB)
where Alice knows GA and Bob knows GB . In fact GA and GB are sufficient statistics. Therefore the
one stage game is of the form depicted in Figure 5.
We assume that this one stage game is repeated n times during which Alice and Bob’s valuations
are chosen randomly at the beginning of the game and remain unchanged. Also we assume that both
players causally observe each other’s actions and recall these actions as well as their own actions. Like
the one stage game, Alice is only aware of her GA and Bob only knows GB . We denote Alice’s and Bob’s
actions in n-stage game by a[1:n] and b[1:n] respectively. At stage t, Alice’s and Bob’s gain are denoted
by GA (at, bt) and GB (at, bt), respectively. Note that these quantities are random variables even if at and
bt are known, since they depend on GA and GB , which are random. In the same manner, for a sequence
of steps, say a[i:j] and b[i:j], we define
GX
(
a[i:j], b[i:j]
)
=
j∑
t=i
GX (at, bt) X ∈ {A,B}.
which is again a random variable. The gain of the whole game is E [GX (An, Bn)] where the expected
value is taken over all possible GA, GB and all possible actions resulting from strategies. Note that since
n is fixed throughout the problem, we do not need to normalize the gain with n.
When GA = gA is known, GA
(
a[i:j], b[i:j]
)
will no longer be a random variable. Similarly, when
GB = gB is known, GB
(
a[i:j], b[i:j]
)
will no longer be a random variable. In this case, we denote these
gains by
GX
(
a[i:j], b[i:j]
∥∥ gX) X ∈ {A,B}.
The main result of this section is to identify an equilibrium for the repeated form of the game.
It is worthwhile to mention the differences between this setup and that of Section 2.4:
1. In the previous setup, valuations are generated independently in n stages while in this setup they
are generated once and for all.
2. In the explicit setup, communication or spying is done prior to the divide and choose procedure,
while in the implicit setup, information is transferred through actions.
3. In Section 2.4 we assume that Bob always chooses the piece which is more valuable for him, which
was reasonable since stages were completely independent, while in the setup of this section, Bob
is free to choose whichever part he wishes; however, as we will see, Bob is better off to choose the
more valuable piece.
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Alice
Bob
1
2 ,
1
2
GA, GB 1−GA, 1−GB
R
L R
NR
Figure 5: The one stage game in our cake cutting scenario. GA and GB are random variables chosen
by the nature, Alice only knows GA and Bob only knows GB but both of them are aware of their joint
probability distribution. Note that if Alice plays NR, since both pieces of cake worth exactly 1/2 for both
parties, we can equivalently assume that Bob has no action left.
4. In this section we assume that there are only two permissible divisions for Alice, while in Section 2.4,
the set of permissible divisions, D is an arbitrary finite set.
As we will see, it is more convenient to look at Bob’s action from another point of view. We say that
Bob plays selfish, or S, if he choses the piece which has more value to him, and we say he plays NS is he
chooses the cake with less value. More precisely,
S =
{
L GB > 1/2
R GB < 1/2
and
NS =
{
R GB > 1/2
L GB < 1/2
Also define
GmaxA = max{GA, 1−GA} GminA = min{GA, 1−GA},
and similarly
GmaxB = max{GB , 1−GB} GminB = min{GB , 1−GB}.
When the value of GA = gA is known, we use g
max
A = max{gA, 1 − gA} to denote the value of GmaxA .
Furthermore, define the random variable T as follows:
T =
{
0 GA > 1/2, GB < 1/2 or GA < 1/2, GB > 1/2
1 otherwise,
Intuitively, T = 0 means that Alice and Bob are interested in the same part of the cake, therefore only
one of them can be happy at the same time. More precisely, it is easy to check that , if Alice plays R and
Bob plays S, when T = 0 Alice receive GminA and Bob receives G
max
B , while when T = 1, Alice receives
GmaxA and Bob receives G
max
B .
Before continuing the discussion, let us clarify our model with an example. For instance, exploiting
the notation of Section 2.4, assume that VA = VB = { , }. Also define Alice’s actions as R = and
NR = . It is evident that in this example, with probability 1 we have
GmaxA = 1 G
min
A = 0 G
max
B = 1 G
min
B = 0.
Also we have
T =
{
1 vA = , vB = or vA = , vB =
0 vA = vB = or vA = vB = .
We will denote Alice’s and Bob’s strategies by SA and SB , respectively. Note that strategies, which
are assumed to be behavioral, are nothing but probability distributions assigning probabilities to each
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action at each node, based on one party’s observations up to that time. Therefore, we use probabilistic
notations for strategies; for instance, SA(a3|a2, b2, gA) is the probability that Alice chooses action a3 at
stage 3 of the game when GA = gA and during stages 1 and 2, players had played action sequences
a2 = (a1, a2), b
2 = (b1, b2).
2.4.1 Main Result
Identification of a strategy:
One strategy for Bob is to always plays selfishly. We denote this strategy by SB .
One possible strategy for Alice in n-stage game, denoted by SA is as follows. Intuitively speaking,
Alice guesses that Bob usually plays selfishly in order to maximize his own gain greedily. Based on this
assumption, she counts the number of times she has risked so far and calculates the number of failures
(with gains less than half) and number of successes (gains more than half) among them. If the number of
successes is more, she guesses that T = 1 and therefore continues to risk. However, if she has failed most
of the times, she stops risking and guarantees herself a gain of 1/2 by playing NR. To be more specific,
at stage k, Alice calculates
ng(k) = |{1 ≤ t ≤ k − 1 : GA (at, bt‖gA) > 1/2}|
nl(k) = |{1 ≤ t ≤ k − 1 : GA (at, bt‖gA) < 1/2}| ,
(13)
then she plays risky at stage k if ng(k) ≥ nl(k), and plays non-risky otherwise. Note that Alice always
plays R at stage 1, since at this time nl(1) = ng(1) = 0.
Conditions for being an equilibrium:
Now assume that in a one stage game, making risk is advantageous for Alice for every value of gA. This
means that her expected gain when playing R is greater than her expected gain when playing non-risky
which is 1/2, i.e.
p(T = 0|GA = gA)gminA + p(T = 1|GA = gA)gmaxA > 1/2 ∀ gA.
We want to show that the above strategy is an equilibrium in the n stage game. In repeated games (and
more generally, in extensive games) instead of taking Nash Equilibrium as the solution, usually Sequential
Equilibrium is considered [19]. We consider even a stronger equilibrium criteria named Trembling Hand
Perfect Equilibrium (THP). In this equilibrium, it is assumed that at each stage, the hand of each player
might “tremble” and he deviates from what he is supposed to do given his strategy. Then, a strategic
game is defined from the extensive game by associating a different player for every player at each stage,
we call each of these (pseudo players) an “agent”. Then the strategy which is going to be proved to be
THP is fixed for one agent and the trembled strategy is considered for other agents. This strategy should
be a best response for all agents when trembling probability goes to zero. For more information about
THP, see [19].
Now we are ready to state our main result
Theorem 4. Assume that Alice is better off playing R at the one stage game, i.e.
p(T = 0|GA = gA)gminA + p(T = 1|GA = gA)gmaxA > 1/2 ∀ gA. (14)
Also we assume that GA 6= 1/2 with probability 1 and p(T = 0|gA), p(T = 1|gA) 6= 0 for all gA. Then
the strategy pair S = (SA, SB) described above in the n stage game, n ≥ 1, is both Nash Equilibrium
and Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (THP). Furthermore, since the game is with perfect recall, this
strategy also yields a Sequential Equilibrium.
Note that since THP is stronger than Nash Equilibrium in games with perfect recall, it suffices to
prove THP. The proof of this theorem is given in Section 6.
3 Adjusted Winner
Assume two parties, say Alice and Bob, are about to divide a set of m goods. Unlike the Divide and
Choose method, they announce their valuations over these goods which are nonnegative vectors of sum
1 and size m, a = (a1, . . . , am) for Alice and b = (b1, . . . , bm) for Bob to a third party whose duty is
to divide these items fairly based on these announced valuations. Adjusted Winner is an algorithm that
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solves a sequence of equations in order to give a division of the items which is equitable, envy free and
efficient [5]. We note that the divide and choose method does not have these properties.
The adjusted winner algorithm divides the items as follows. Reorder the items so that,
a1
b1
≥ a2
b2
≥ · · · ≥ at
bt
≥ 1 > at+1
bt+1
≥ · · · ≥ am
bm
. (15)
Then give items 1 through t to Alice and items t + 1 through m to Bob. If their gains at this step is
equal, the job is finished. First assume Alice’s gain is more. In this case, give a portion of item t to Bob
so that their gain becomes equal. If even by giving all of item t this did not happen, go for item t − 1
and continue this procedure until the equality holds. For the second case when Bob’s gain is more, in a
similar way, give a portion of item t+ 1 to Alice to achieve equality. If this was not sufficient, go to item
t+ 2 and continue. Since eventually by giving all the items to the party with less gain, his gain becomes
more, at some point in between their gains become equal and the procedure terminates.
3.1 Spying in Adjusted Winner
A motivation for studying spying in the adjusted winner game is a result by Brams and Taylor who
showed that in the case of having two items, a dishonest party who has full information about the other
party’s valuation vector, while the other party is unaware of this and acts honestly (i.e., the other party is
spying), can trick the referee [5]. We are interested in quantifying the benefit partial spying, by assuming
that Bob announces his valuation honestly while Alice uses the partial information he has gained by
spying over Bob’s valuation to trick the referee and announce an untrue valuation instead of her true
valuation.
3.1.1 Reduction to Divide and Choose
Assume that the valuation vectors a = (a1, . . . , am) and b = (b1, . . . , bm) are limited to be taking values
in finite sets, and Alice can spy any arbitrary function of Bob’s valuation vector consistent with her spying
rate. The assumption that the set of valuations is finite is a practical assumption since we can assume
that the value assigned to an item by each individual is a real number with finite precision. Therefore
the set of all valuation vectors is finite.
We can find the trade off between the “spying rate” and Alice’s “spying gain” via a simple trans-
formation from adjusted winner problem (AW) to the divide and choose (DC) problem as follows: Let
Alice’s announced valuation, a˜, plays the role of the division D in divide and choose and the following
gain functions could be defined,
GA (a˜,a‖b) = AWA (a˜,b) · a,
GB (a˜,a‖b) = AWB (a˜,b) · b,
(16)
where · is the inner product operation. Note that although the two problems have conceptual differences,
by using this transformation, we can consider this problem a special case of divide and choose. Also note
that in this approach, the assumption of having two items, m = 2, is not necessary.
3.1.2 Restriction on the structure of spying
The drawback of the above approach is that Alice is allowed to spy a complicated function of Bob’s
valuation vector. Let us restrict Alice to be able to only spy a set of simpler (but more realistic)
questions of the form “Is Bob’s valuation on the first item less than a particular value α or more than
that?”. We call these binary dividing questions. To study this problem, as in Brams and Taylor’s work,
we assume that the number of items, m, is equal to 2. In this case the valuations are a = (a, 1 − a)
for Alice and b = (b, 1 − b) for Bob. Therefore we can simply take a and b as valuation numbers or
more simply valuations. We assume that Alice’s valuation is fixed, while Bob’s valuation of the first item
is uniformly distributed in an interval b ∈ [bmin, bmax]. A binary dividing question divide the interval
[bmin, bmax] into two subintervals. A sequence of k dividing questions is like doing a dictionary search and
can be represented in terms of cutting points b0 < b1 < · · · < b2k where b0 = bmin and b2k = bmax.
Let ∆∗k (bmin, bmax) denote the maximum increase in Alice’s gain by asking the optimal k binary di-
vision questions. Clearly ∆∗0 (bmin, bmax) = 0 and {∆∗k (bmin, bmax)}k=0,1,2,··· is a non-decreasing sequence
of numbers because the more questions, the better Alice can perform. Since the valuation vectors add
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up to one, the maximum possible utility of Alice is one, and hence the increase in Alice’s utility by k
questions, ∆∗k (bmin, bmax), is also bounded from above by one.
We ask the following questions:
Q1. Does the value of spying questions depreciate over time? For instance, is it true that the extra gain
we get by asking the third question is less than the gain we get by asking second question, i.e.,
∆∗2 (bmin, bmax)−∆∗1 (bmin, bmax)
?≥ ∆∗3 (bmin, bmax)−∆∗2 (bmin, bmax) .
In other words, is {∆∗k (bmin, bmax)}k=0,1,2,··· a concave sequence of numbers?
Q2. Assuming that the answer to the above question cannot be answered affirmative in all cases, can
we find a linear control on the growth of ∆∗k (bmin, bmax) ≤ k∆˜, with ∆˜ as small as possible?
Before answering Q1 and Q2, let us discuss one of their implications. Let us assume for a moment
that instead of playing a single Adjusted Winner game, we are playing n repetitions of the game. More
specifically, assume that during n games, Bob’s valuation is i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed
in [bmin, bmax] and a is fixed in all games. If Alice is allowed to ask R questions on average in each game,
or totally nR questions, we are interested in finding bounds for the Alice’s expected improvement in gain
averaged over n games. If the answer to Q1 is affirmative, then the strategy of spying either bRc or dRe
questions in each game (with the average number of questions no larger than R) maximizes the spying
gain of Alice. To see this in the case of R being an integer, observe that if Alice asks ti questions in game
i, then her average improvement in gain will be at most,
1
n
n∑
i=1
∆∗ti (bmin, bmax) ≤ ∆∗1n ∑ ti (bmin, bmax) ≤ ∆∗R (bmin, bmax) , (17)
where we have used the concavity of the sequence. If the answer to Q2 is affirmative, then the average
improvement on Alice’s expected gain which is averaged over n games is bounded by R∆˜ since if Alice
asks ti questions in the ith game, her maximum improvement is,
1
n
n∑
i=1
∆∗ti ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
ti∆˜ = R∆˜, (18)
For Q1, we have the following result:
Theorem 5. For a fixed 1/2 ≤ bmin < bmax ≤ 1, if a is outside the interval (τl, τu) where
τu(bmin, bmax) =
2b2max + 2bmaxbmin
bmax + 3bmin
,
τl(bmin, bmax) =
2bmaxbmin + 2b
2
min
3bmax + bmin
,
(19)
then the sequence {∆∗k (bmin, bmax)}∞k=0 is concave. Furthermore, the optimal cutting points {b0, b1, · · · , b2k}
forms a geometric progression. More specifically, having asked i− 1 questions and having ended up with
b ∈ [x, y] as the interval of Bob’s valuation, Alice should ask whether b ∈ [x,√xy] or b ∈ [√xy, y] as her
i-th question.
Remark 2. The assumption 1/2 ≤ bmin < bmax ≤ 1 means that Alice knows which of the two items Bob
likes more, but she does not know his exact valuation. Also note that the case which bmin < bmax < 1/2
(the entire interval falls in the left half) could be reduced to this case by changing the order of items.
For Q2, we have the following result:
Theorem 6. Assume that for bmin ≤ x < y ≤ bmax, ∆∗1 (x, y) is differentiable with respect to y. Then
∆˜(x, y) defined by
∆˜ = max
bmin≤γ1≤γ2≤bmax
Λ(γ1, γ2), (20)
where Λ(x, y) = ∂∂yΓ(x, y) defined as follows
Γ(x, y) =
{
(y − x)∆∗1 (x, y) y > x,
0 y = x,
(21)
satisfies
∆∗k (bmin, bmax) ≤ k∆˜, ∀k.
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4 Maximum Nash Collective Utility Function
In this section we consider an arbitrary society with a government who wants to divide its several resources
among the citizens. Each person assigns a value for each of the resources available to the government, and
we assume that the government knows these valuations. The Nash collective utility function (Nash CUF)
for a given division strategy is equal to the product of the gains of individual members of the society
of that division strategy. Maximizing the Nash CUF for this society implies a division policy for the
government, specifying how much of each resource should be allocated to each individual. For practical
reasons the government may want to divide the citizens into several clusters, say drivers, teachers, etc,
and apply the same division strategy uniformly to all people from the same class. We consider the
increase of Nash CUF for a clustering refinement and draw conceptual links between this problem and
the portfolio selection problem in stock markets [20].
4.1 The model
Assume that the population of the society is n, which is fixed. The valuation vectors of all the individuals
in the society is known to the government. We assume that the government has partitioned the society
into k clusters P = (P1, . . . ,Pk). Let ni denote the number of people in cluster Pi and αi = nin . The
government has decided to use a fixed division strategy for all people in cluster i which is denoted
by bi. The sum of the portion each individual receives should sum up to one, i.e.
∑k
i=1 nibi = 1 =∑k
i=1(nαi)bi = 1. Let us denote the the valuation vector of people in cluster i by vi1,vi2, . . . ,vini .
Based on the valuation vectors of individuals, the government wants to divide the items so as to
maximize the Nash CUD of the society, which is
WP = max
b1:k
∏
i
ni∏
j=1
btivij . (22)
In the second scenario, the government divides one of the classes, say the first class, into two subclasses
1a and 1b and uses different division protocols for these subclasses. If P ′ denotes the new partitioning
and WP′ to be the maximum Nash CUF in the new scenario,
WP′ = max
b′1a,b
′
1b,b
′
2:k
∏
v1a
b
′t
1av1a
∏
v1b
b
′t
1bv1b
k∏
i=2
ni∏
j=1
b
′t
i vi,j . (23)
By taking b′1a = b
′
1b = b1 and b
′
i = bi for i > 1, we realize that WP′ ≥ WP . In fact by refining the
classification, the government can improve the social welfare, which was expected. In this section, we are
interested in finding an upper bound on the possible improvement after this refinement.
Define Vi to be the random variable whose distribution is the empirical distribution of the valuation
vector of people in class i, i.e. for any set A
P (Vi ∈ A) = |#j : vij ∈ A|
ni
, (24)
also define r.v.’s V1a and V1b to be the random variables for empirical distribution of subclasses 1a and
1b. Values of α1a and α1b are defined in a natural way by dividing the size of classes 1a and 1b to n.
Note that
p(V1 = v1) =
α1a
α1
p(V1a = v1) +
α1b
α1
p(V1b = v1).
We can define a random variable E indicating where a randomly chosen person from class 1 belongs to 1a,
or to 1b. In this case p(E = 0) = α1a/α1 and p(E = 1) = α1b/α1. Also p(V1 = v1|E = 0) = p(V1a = v1)
and p(V1 = v1|E = 1) = p(V1b = v1), which is simply the Bayes rule. We denote the support of V1 by
the set V1 (i.e. p(V1 = v1) > 0 ⇐⇒ v1 ∈ V1). Similarly we let V1a and V1b to be the support of V1a
and V1b. Note that V1a ⊂ V1 and V1b ⊂ V1.
In a more generalized but similar case, we can assume that instead of dividing cluster P1 into 2
clusters, we divide it into t clusters P1,1, . . . ,P1,t and show the new partitioning by P ′. Exactly in the
same way, we define random variables E and V1.
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Remark 3. If we define the distance between two non-negative vectors v and w by − log(v · w), we
can reexpress the problem of finding an optimal k-clustering as an unsupervised clustering of the valu-
ation vectors of the whole society into k clusters. Vectors bi will be the centers which need to satisfy∑k
i=1 nibi = 1. Note that − log(v ·w) is not a metric.
Our result is the following:
Theorem 7. With the above notations, if we refine the clustering P by dividing cluster P1 into t clusters
resulting in a new clustering P ′, we have,
WP ≤WP′ ≤WP2n1I(V1;E), (25)
Remark 4. Since P ′ is a refined version of P, the lower bound on WP′ is expected. To intuitively under-
stand the upper bound, note that a good clustering of P1 puts valuation vectors that are geometrically
close to each other into the same cluster. Therefore knowing that a person is in a certain cluster P1,E
for some E should provide some information about the geometrical location of the valuation vector of
the person. Thus I(V1;E) is large for a good clustering. However a large I(V1;E) does not necessarily
imply a good clustering. Such information theoretic interpretation of clustering (traditionally a topic
of data mining and machine learning) may be new (we have not seen it) and it may be of independent
interest.
Remark 5. The distribution of p(v1) is the empirical distribution of valuation vectors in P1 and p(v1|E =
e) is the empirical distribution of valuation vectors in P1,e. I(V1;E) is computable from these empirical
distributions.
Proof of Theorem 7. As we have already discussed, WP′ ≥ WP , and it remains to prove the other side.
For simplicity, we assume that t = 2; the case of t > 2 is similar. Note that maximizing WP is equal to
maximizing
1
n
logWP = max
b1:k
∑
i
1
n
ni∑
j=1
log(btivij) = max
b1:k
∑
i
αi
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
log(btivij)
= max
b1:k
∑
i
αiE
[
log(btiVi)
]
,
Similarly,
1
n
logWP′ = max
b′1a,b
′
1b,b
′
2:k
(
α1aE
[
log(b
′t
1aV1a)
]
+ α1bE
[
log(b
′t
1bV1b)
]
+
∑
i=2:k
αiE
[
log(b
′t
i Vi)
] )
.
The above equations show that Nash Collective Utility is equivalent to the mathematics of portfolio
selection problem in stock markets (see [20]), if we interpret division into groups as the equivalent to
side information. With this in mind, the benefit of adding extra groups equivalent to adding additional
side information. If we show the original divisions into groups (previous side information) by rv E′, the
new division into groups will be corresponding to random variables (E˜, E′) where we assume that E˜ is a
constant when E′ 6= 1, and E˜ = E when E′ = 1. Thus, from the increase in the exponent of the growth
[20], we get
1
n
logWP − 1
n
logWP′ ≤ I(V ; E˜|E′) = α1I(V ; E˜|E′ = 1) = α1I(V ;E) = n1
n
I(V ;E).
5 Proofs for explicit Divide and Choose
5.1 Proof for one-shot spying
Proof of Theorem 1. We employ the technique of [21] to provide a lower bound on the expected utility
of Alice after spying about Bob’s valuation. Let C = {U(j)}Jj=1 be a random product codebook, in which
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are drawn independently from qU . Let B : [1 : J] 7→ [1 : M] be a random mapping (binning), mapping
each element of [1 : J] uniformly and independently to the set [1 : M].
We draw an index j ∈ [1 : J] with the probability
PEnc(j|vB) = 2
ıq(vB ;U(j))∑
j˜ 2
ıq(vB ;U(j˜))
=
qVB |U (vB |U(j))∑
j˜ qVB |U (vB |U(j˜))
.
where we have use capital P since the above conditional pmf is itself random (due to the random codebook
generation). Then, we transmits m = B(j) to Alice as the spying content. Alice uses m to draw jˆ from
the following pmf
PDec(jˆ|m, vA) = 2
ıq(vA;U(jˆ))1{B(jˆ) = m}∑
j¯ 2
ıq(vA;U(j¯))1{B(j¯) = m} ,
where 1[·] is the indicator function. Finally, Alice produces D from qD|UVA(d|U(jˆ), vA).
Observe that the joint distribution of random variables factors as,
P (vA, vB ,m, j, jˆ, d) = q(vA, vB)PEnc(j|vB)1{B(j) = m}PDec(jˆ|m, vA)q(d|U(jˆ), vA).
We now compute the expected value of Alice’s gain over the random codebook and random binning:
E[GA (D,VA‖VB)] = EC,B
∑
vA,vB ,d,m,j,jˆ
P (vA, vB ,m, j, jˆ, d)GA (d, vA‖vB) (26)
≥ EC,B
∑
vA,vB ,d,m,j
P (vA, vB ,m, j, Jˆ = j, d)GA (d, vA‖vB)
= EC,B
∑
vA,vB ,d,m,j
q(vA, vB)PEnc(j|vB)1{B(j) = m}PDec(j|m, vA)q(d|U(j), vA)GA (d, vA‖vB)
= EC,B
∑
vA,vB ,d
MJ · q(vA, vB)PEnc(1|vB)1{B(1) = 1}PDec(1|1, vA)q(d|U(1), vA)GA (d, vA‖vB) (27)
= EC,B
∑
vA,vB ,d
MJ · q(vA, vB) 2
ıq(vB ;U(1))∑
j˜ 2
ıq(vB ;U(j˜))
2ıq(vA;U(1))1{B(1) = 1}∑
j¯ 2
ıq(vA;U(j¯))1{B(j¯) = 1}q(d|U(1), vA)GA (d, vA‖vB)
=
∑
vA,vB ,d
M · q(vA, vB)EU(1),B(1)EC,B|U(1),B(1) J2
ıq(vB ;U(1))∑
j˜ 2
ıq(vB ;U(j˜))
2ıq(vA;U(1))1{B(1) = 1}∑
j¯ 2
ıq(vA;U(j¯))1{B(j¯) = 1}×
× q(d|U(1), vA)GA (d, vA‖vB)
≥
∑
vA,vB ,d
M · q(vA, vB)EU(1),B(1) J2
ıq(vB ;U(1))
EC,B|U(1),B(1)
∑
j˜ 2
ıq(vB ;U(j˜))
2ıq(vA;U(1))1{B(1) = 1}
EC,B|U(1),B(1)
∑
j¯ 2
ıq(vA;U(j¯))1{B(j¯) = 1}×
× q(d|U(1), vA)GA (d, vA‖vB) (28)
≥
∑
vA,vB ,d
M · q(vA, vB)EU(1),B(1) J2
ıq(vB ;U(1))
J− 1 + 2ıq(vB ;U(1))
2ıq(vA;U(1))1{B(1) = 1}
(J− 1)M−1 + 2ıq(vA;U(1))1{B(1) = 1}×
× q(d|U(1), vA)GA (d, vA‖vB) (29)
=
∑
vA,vB ,d
q(vA, vB)EU(1)
J2ıq(vB ;U(1))
J− 1 + 2ıq(vB ;U(1))
2ıq(vA;U(1))
(J− 1)M−1 + 2ıq(vA;U(1)) q(d|U(1), vA)GA (d, vA‖vB)
=
∑
vA,vB ,d,u
q(vA, vB , u)
J
J− 1 + 2ıq(vB ;u)
2ıq(vA;u)
(J− 1)M−1 + 2ıq(vA;u) q(d|u, vA)GA (d, vA‖vB) (30)
= E
[ 1
1− J−1 + J−12ıq(VB ;U)
1
1 + (J− 1)M−12−ıq(VA;U)GA (D,VA‖VB)
]
,
where equation (27) is due to the symmetry of the random codebook generation; equation (28) follows
from Jensen’s inequality for the jointly convex function f(x1, x2) = 1/(x1x2); equation (29) follows from
the fact that for any j˜ 6= 1
EC,B|U(1),B(1)2ıq(vB ;U(j˜)) =
∑
u
q(u)
q(vB , u)
q(vB)q(u)
= 1.
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Similarly for any j¯ 6= 1
EC,B|U(1),B(1)2ıq(vA;U(j¯))1{B(j¯) = 1} =
∑
u
q(u)
q(vA, u)
q(vA)q(u)
M−1 = M−1.
Equation (30) follows from the fact that EU(1) is over q(u) and
2ıq(vB ;u) =
q(u|vB)
q(u)
and q(vA, vB , u) = q(vA, vB)q(u|vB).
The derivation of Bob’s gain is similar. Note that the spying strategy of Alice is randomized here.
Based on a private randomness (the random codebook and random binning), she decides her spying
function.
Deriving the loosened bound is as follows:
E
[ 1
1 + J−12ıq(VB ;U)
1
1 + JM−12−ıq(VA;U)
GA (D,VA‖VB)
]
≥ E[1[{log J− ı(VB ;U) ≥ γ, ı(VA;U)− log(JM−1) ≥ γ}]
(1 + J−12ıq(VB ;U))(1 + JM−12−ıq(VA;U))
GA (D,VA‖VB)
]
≥ 1
(1 + 2−γ)2
E
[
1[
{
log J− ı(VB ;U) ≥ γ, ı(VA;U)− log(JM−1) ≥ γ
}
]GA (D,VA‖VB)
]
≥ (1− 3× 2−γ)E[1[{log J− ı(VB ;U) ≥ γ, ı(VA;U)− log(JM−1) ≥ γ}]GA (D,VA‖VB) ]
= (1− 3× 2−γ)E
[(
1− 1[{log J− ı(VB ;U) ≥ γ, or ı(VA;U)− log(JM−1) ≥ γ}])GA (D,VA‖VB) ]
≥ (1− 3× 2−γ)E[GA (D,VA‖VB) ]− g¯(1− 3× 2−γ)P[{log J− ı(VB ;U) ≥ γ, or ı(VA;U)− log(JM−1) ≥ γ}]
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
For achievability, we use the existing results on the empirical coordination, which is summarized as
follows. Assume two terminals have i.i.d.˜samples of random variables X1 and X2 with joint pmf p(x1, x2),
i.e. p(xn1 , x
n
2 ) =
∏n
i=1 p(x1,i, x2,i). The goal is to simulate the channel p(y1, y2|x1, x2) and generate Y1
and Y2 in terminals 1 and 2 respectively. Since the first terminal has only access to X1 while Y1 is
dependent on both X1 and X2, which is the same story for the second terminal, the two terminals need
to communicate with some rate in order to gain information about the other terminal so that they can
simulate the channel. This process could involve multiple rounds of communication in general. The two
terminals need to generate jointly typical sequences of Y n1 and Y
n
2 with X
n
1 , X
n
2 with high probability.
Substituting X1 by VA, X2 by VB , Y1 by D and Y2 by a constant, say 0, one can observe from the result
of [22] that empirical coordination holds if R > I(VB ;U |VA). Using properties of typical sequences,
|G˜A −GA| = | 1
n
n∑
i=1
GA (Di, VA,i‖VB,i)− E [GA (D,VA‖VB)] | ≤ δGA ≤ δ, (31)
since gains are bounded by 1. The same inequality holds for G˜B . This proves the achievability.
The converse has much in common with the proof of the converse in [22] by setting X1 = VA, X2 = VB ,
D = Y1 and Y2 = 0 in their terminology. Assuming an (n,R) code with communication variable C and
division Dn, we define the auxiliary random variables U and D as follows: take Q to be a random variable
independent from all other random variables and uniformly distributed in [1 : n] and
U = CVA[Q+1:n]VB[1:Q−1]Q,
D = DQ,
(32)
note that since Q is uniform and independent from all other random variables and V nA and V
n
B are i.i.d.
therefore VAQ = VA and VBQ = VB . Showing the Markov chains VA → VB → U and VB → VAU → D and
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the inequality I(U ;VA|VB) ≤ H(C)/n are identical to that of [22] and thus omitted from here. Finally,
note that
|E [GA (D,VA‖VB)]−GA| = |E [GA (DQ, VA,Q‖VB,Q)]−GA|
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
q=1
E [GA (Dq, VA,q‖VB,q)]−GA
∣∣∣∣∣
= |G˜A −GA| < δ.
(33)
Following a similar procedure |G˜B −GB | < δ.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3. Let us fix some alphabet set S and pmf p(s) for the shared randomness. Then,
the strategy of Bob is q(c|vnB , s) where c is the message on the alphabet set [1 : 2nR]. Alice’s strategy
is q(dn|vnA, c, s) where di is the division by Alice in i-th game. For choosing Di, Alice should only see
how much it has learnt from C, S and VAi about VBi. This is due to the fact that the gain in the i-th
stage depends only on the conditional pmf of VAi about VBi given C = c and S = s, i.e., only the
marginal conditional distribution q(vAi, vBi|c, s) matters. In other words, if we fix some action q(c|vnB , s)
for Bob, instead of the original identical distributions on (VAi, VBi), the two players play the cut and
choose game with the modified pmfs qi(vA, vB) = q(vAi, vBi|c, s) for i ∈ [n]. Observe that the Markov
chain C → V nBS → V nA , independence of S from V nB , V nA , and the fact that (V nB , V nA ) are i.i.d., imply that
CS → VBi → VAi for i ∈ [1 : n]. Hence,
q(vAi, vBi|cs) = q(vBi|cs)(vAi|vBi, cs) = q(vBi|cs)q(vAi|vBi).
Therefore, conditioning on c and s changes only the marginal distribution on VBi, and the conditional
distribution of VAi given VBi is not affected.
Fix some action p(c|vnB , s) for Bob. After revealing C = c, S = s, the marginal distribution of
(VAi, VBi) reduces to q(vAi, vBi|c, s). Alice plays her best response in the i-th game, and a rate pairs from
G(q(vAi, vBi|c, s)) will occur. We assume that Alice’s choice of her best response is such that
(GA(q(vAi, vBi|c, s)), G∗B(q(vAi, vBi|c, s))) ∈ G(q(vAi, vBi|c, s))
occurs. Then, let r(c|vnB , s) be a maximizer of
max
r(c|vnBs)
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
c,s
r(c, s)G∗B(r(vAi, vBi|c, s)), (34)
where the expression is computed with respect to r(c, s, vnA, v
n
B) = r(c|vnB , s)q(vnA, vnB)p(s). Then r(c|vnB , s)
will lead to an equilibrium; Alice is always playing one of her best responses and Bob has maximized his
payoff by choosing r(c|vnB , s). The gain of Alice will then become
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
c,s
r(c, s)GA(r(vAi, vBi|c, s)). (35)
It remains to show that the payoffs given in equations (34) and (35) can be related to the ones given
in the statement of the theorem in equation (12). We argue that the following two claims establish our
desired result: Claim 1 is that for any n, any p(s), and any r(c|vnB , s) for |C| ≤ 2nR, we have that
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
∑
c,s
r(c, s)G∗B(r(vAi, vBi|c, s)) ≤ GBmax. (36)
Therefore, the payoff of Bob in the Nash equilibriums that we have defined in equation (34) cannot exceed
GBmax. Claim 2 is that for any  > 0, any arbitrary q(c˜|vB) where I(C˜;VB) = R − , we can find a
sufficiently large n, shared randomness p(s), and some q(c|vnB , s) where |C| ≤ 2nR such that the gain of
player B,
GainB =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
c,s
q(c, s)G∗B(q(vAi, vBi|c, s))
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satisfies
|GainB −
∑
c˜
q(c˜)G∗B(q(vA, vB |c˜))| ≤ , (37)
and the gain of the player A,
GainA =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
c,s
p(c, s)GA(q(vAi, vBi|c, s))
satisfies
|GainA −
∑
c˜
q(c˜)GA(q(vA, vB |c˜))| ≤ . (38)
The above two claims prove our result. The reason is that by Claim 1, Bob can never expect to have
a payoff larger than GBmax. Then if we choose some q(c˜|vB) where I(C˜;VB) ≤ R − /2 such that∑
c˜ q(c˜)G
∗
B(q(vA, vB |c˜)) is within /2 of GBmax, Claim 2 shows that the resulting strategy of Bob will
be within  of GBmax. Therefore, it has to be an -equilibrium from the perspective of Bob. Since Alice
is always performing her best response cut (as we consider GA(q(vAi, vBi|c, s))), she does not have any
incentive to change her actions. Therefore, the payoffs given in equations (34) and (35) can be made
within  distance of the rate pair given in equation (12).
Proof of Claim 1: Let Q be a time-sharing variable, uniform on [1 : n] and independent of previously
defined variables. Setting C˜ = (C,Q, S), V˜B = VBQ, V˜A = VAQ we get that∑
c˜
q(c˜)G∗B(q(v˜A, v˜B |c˜)) =
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
∑
c,s
q(c, s)G∗B(q(vAi, vBi|c, s)).
Furthermore, the joint pmf of (V˜A, V˜B) is q(vA, vB). Finally, the inequality R ≥ I(C˜; V˜B) holds since
nR ≥ H(C)
≥ I(C;V nB |S)
= I(CS;V nB ) (39)
=
n∑
i=1
I(CS;VBi|VB1:i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(CSVB1:i−1;VBi)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(CS;VBi)
= n · I(CS;VBQ|Q)
= n · I(CSQ;VBQ)
= n · I(C˜; V˜B),
where (39) follows from the independence of shared randomness Sn from V nB . Proof of Claim 2: Let
(C˜n, V nA , V
n
B ) be n i.i.d. repetitions according to q(c˜, vA, vB) = q(c˜, vB)q(vA|vB). Then clearly,∑
c˜
q(c˜)GA(q(vAi, vBi|c˜)) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
c˜n
q(c˜n)GA(q(vAi, vBi|c˜i)), (40)
∑
c˜
q(c˜)G∗B(q(vAi, vBi|c˜)) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
c˜n
q(c˜n)G∗B(q(vAi, vBi|c˜i)). (41)
The problem is that the alphabet set of C˜n can be much larger than 2nR = 2n(I(VB ;C˜)+). In the rest of
the proof, we show how to reduce the cardinality of the message to around 2n(I(VB ;C˜)+).
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Let B1 and B2 be two random bin index of C˜
n at rates 2n(H(C˜|VB)−

2 ) and [1 : 2n(I(VB ;C˜)+)] re-
spectively. Then, for almost all choices of the random binning, one can recover C˜n from (B1, B2) with
probability 1−  (Slepian-Wolf) via a deterministic mapping qSW (c˜n|b1, b2) such that
‖qSW (c˜n|b1, b2)q(b1, b2)− q(c˜n, b1, b2)‖ ≤ . (42)
Further by the OSRB lemma [23, Theorem 1], B2 is almost independent of V
n
B :
‖q(b2, vnB)− q(b2)q(vnB)‖ ≤ . (43)
Furthermore, because B1 and B2 are functions of C˜
n, we have q(b1, b2, v
n
A, v
n
B) = q(b1, b2, v
n
B)q(v
n
A|vnB).
From equation (43), we have
‖q(b1, b2, vnA, vnB)− q(b2)q(vnA, vnB)q(b1|vnBb2)‖ ≤ . (44)
Then, from equations (42) and the fact that qSW (c˜n|b1, b2) is a deterministic mapping, we get
‖q(b1, b2, c˜n, vnA, vnB)− q(b2)q(vnA, vnB)q(b1|vnBb2)qSW (c˜n|b1, b2)‖ ≤ 2. (45)
Let us assume the following alternative desirable scenario with B2 as a shared randomness between
the two players. Shared randomness B2 is independent of (V
n
A , V
n
B ) and jointly distributed according to
q(b2)q(v
n
A, v
n
B). Message B2 is created by Bob from (V
n
B , B2) according to q(b1|vnBb2) and sent to Alice; the
rate of this message is R. Alice uses B1 and B2 to recover C˜
n via the deterministic function qSW (c˜n|b1, b2).
The joint pmf induced by the alternative scenario will be q(b2)q(v
n
A, v
n
B)q(b1|vnBb2)qSW (c˜n|b1, b2), which
is in 2 total variation distance of the original i.i.d. pmf by equation (45). With probability 1 − 2, the
two scenarios are not statistically distinguishable. Hence,∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
∑
b1,b2
q(b1, b2)G
∗
B(q(vAi, vBi|b1, b2))−
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
c˜n
q(c˜n)G∗B(q(vAi, vBi|c˜))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2g¯B , (46)
where g¯B is a universal upper bound on G
∗
B(p(·, ·)) for all pmfs p(·, ·). Using equation (41), we obtain∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
∑
b1,b2
q(b1, b2)G
∗
B(q(vAi, vBi|b1, b2))−
∑
c˜
q(c˜)G∗B(q(vAi, vBi|c˜))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2g¯B . (47)
Similarly, we have∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
∑
b1,b2
q(b1, b2)GA(q(vAi, vBi|b1, b2))−
∑
c˜
q(c˜)GA(q(vAi, vBi|c˜))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2g¯A, (48)
where g¯A is a universal upper bound on GA(p(·, ·)) for all pmfs p(·, ·). The alternative scenario works
for us because by taking communication variable as B1 and shared randomness S as B2, we obtain the
desired result.
6 Proof of Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (THP)
Let S = (SA, SB) denote the strategy given in Section 2.4.1. In order to show that this pair of strategy
is THP, we should introduce a sequence of completely mixed strategies converging to S where S should
be the best response at all information sets for every element of the sequence. Define completely mixed
strategy pair S = (SA, S

B) as follows. At any given information set, the player who should continue the
game chooses the action given by S with probability 1−  and the other possible action with probability
. Then with  → 0, S converges to S. We will show that for  small enough, S is the best response
at any information set given S for other information sets, yielding the desired sequence of completely
mixed strategies.
For doing so, for any given information set θ, we fix strategy S for information sets θˆ 6= θ and find the
optimal action at θ. This action turns out to be the action given by strategy S. θ can be an information
set of Alice or Bob. In the following, we first analyze Alice’s information sets and then we will go through
Bob’s information sets in Section 6.2.
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6.1 Alice’s Information Sets
Assume θ = (gA, a
k−1, bk−1) is a given information set for Alice. Assume ng(k) and nl(k) are the number
of gains and losses of Alice in this information set as was defined in (13) which could be computed by
having θ. We shall fix strategy S for all other information sets and find the optimal strategy in θ.
Such a strategy would be relevant only if we pass through θ. Upon reaching θ, Alice’s strategy would
be a combination of playing R and NR. However, since the resulting maximization is linear and hence
could be restricted to pure strategies in this information set, it suffices to show that the action given
by strategy S in θ is optimal. Also, note that since θ is given, Alice’s gains at stages 1 through k − 1
could be deterministically calculated. Therefore, we only need to consider gains at stages k through n
and show that playing according to the strategy in θ is optimal. In other words, we want to show that
for sufficiently small , the maximum
max
ak∈{R,NR}
ES
[GA ((ak, A[k+1:n]), B[k:n]) |θ]
is taken for ak = R if ng(k) ≥ nl(k), and ak = NR if ng(k) > nl(k) where ng(k) and nl(k) are the gains
and losses of Alice which can be computed from θ = (gA, a
k−1, bk−1). Let
fR() = ES
[GA ((Ak = R, A[k+1:n]), B[k:n]) |θ]
fNR() = ES
[GA ((Ak = NR, A[k+1:n]), B[k:n]) |θ] . (49)
Observe that in fNR(), since Ak = NR, Bob has no choice in that stage of the game and the value of Bk
is irrelevant. We need to compare fNR() and fR() for  sufficiently small.
Observe that
fR() = p(T = 0|θ)ES
[GA ((Ak = R, A[k+1:n]), B[k:n]) |θ, T = 0]
+ p(T = 1|θ)ES
[GA ((Ak = R, A[k+1:n]), B[k:n]) |θ, T = 1]
A similar expression could be written for fNR(). In order to make the comparison, we need the following
lemma:
Lemma 1. If ng(k) < nl(k) then
lim
→0
p(T = 1|θ)
p(T = 0|θ) = 0.
Also if nl(k) < ng(k) then
lim
→0
p(T = 0|θ)
p(T = 1|θ) = 0,
and finally if ng(k) = nl(k) then for all values of  we have
p(T = 0|θ)
p(T = 1|θ) =
p(T = 0|gA)
p(T = 1|gA) .
We provide the proof of this lemma later but observe that this lemma has an intuitive interpretation:
when ng(k) > nl(k), it is more probable that T = 1, since T = 0 results in more losses to Alice, therefore
it suffices for Alice to assume T = 1 and perform her strategy accordingly, which is R in this case. On the
other hand, when ng(k) < nl(k), Alice is better off assuming T = 0 and play NR. When ng(k) = nl(k),
the posteriors p(T = 0|gA) and p(T = 1|gA) is Alice’s belief on T .
This lemma implies that to compare fR() with fNR() for small , when ng(k) > nl(k) we need to
compare
fˆX() = ES
[GA ((Ak = X,A[k+1:n]), B[k:n]) |θ, T = 1] ,
for two value of X = R and X = NR. Similarly, when ng < nl we need to compare
fˆX() = ES
[GA ((Ak = X,A[k+1:n]), B[k:n]) |θ, T = 0] ,
and when ng = nl we should compare
fˆX() = p(T = 0|gA)ES
[GA ((Ak = X,A[k+1:n]), B[k:n]) |θ, T = 0]
+ p(T = 1|gA)ES
[GA ((Ak = X,A[k+1:n]), B[k:n]) |θ, T = 1] .
In the sequel, we do the comparisons for these three cases separately.
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6.1.1 ng(k) = nl(k)
In this case, we show that fˆR(0) > fˆNR(0) which implies that for small values of , we have fˆR() > fˆNR().
To do so, note that setting  = 0 is equivalent to setting A[k+1:n] and B[k+1:n] to the path given by strategy
S.
In order to compute fˆR(0), note that such a path could be obtained by noting that when T = 0, Alice
plays R in stage k which results to a loss (since Bob plays S and T = 0) and from then on, Alice plays
NR resulting in an overall gain of gminA + (n − k)/2. On the other hand, when T = 1, Alice will always
gain and ng will always remain greater than nl, yielding an overall gain of (n− k + 1)gmaxA . Therefore
fˆR(0) = p(T = 0|gA)
(
gminA +
n− k
2
)
+ p(T = 1|gA)(n− k + 1)gmaxA .
fˆNR(0) could be computed similarly. Note that when T = 0, since we have assumed that Alice plays
NR in stage k, he gains 1/2 in that stage, leaving ng = nl. If k < n, Alice risks in stage k + 1 and will
play NR in the remaining stages. This will give her a total gain of
1
2
+ 1[k<n]g
min
A +
1
2
(n− k − 1)+ .
On the other hand, when T = 1, Alice gains 1/2 in stage k and then will risk at the remaining stage and
will gain gmaxA yielding an overall gain of
1
2 + (n− k)gmaxA . Hence,
fˆNR(0) = p(T = 0|gA)
(
1
2
+ 1[k<n]g
min
A +
1
2
(n− k − 1)+
)
+ p(T = 1|gA)
(
1
2
+ (n− k)gmaxA
)
.
In order to compare these two values, note that
fˆR(0)− fˆNR(0) = p(T = 0|GA = gA)
(
1[k=n]g
min
A +
1
2
(n− k − 1)−
)
+ p(T = 1|GA = gA)
(
gmaxA −
1
2
)
=
{
p(T = 0|GA = gA)
(
gminA − 12
)
+ p(T = 1|GA = gA)
(
gmaxA − 12
)
k = n
p(T = 1|GA = gA)
(
gmaxA − 12
)
k < n
(a)
≥ p(T = 0|GA = gA)
(
gminA −
1
2
)
+ p(T = 1|GA = gA)
(
gmaxA −
1
2
)
(b)
> 0
where (a) exploits the fact that gminA ≤ 1/2 and (b) uses our main assumption (14). Since this is strictly
greater than zero, we are done in this case.
6.1.2 ng(k) > nl(k)
As was discussed before, we should only consider the terms corresponding to T = 1. Quite similar to the
discussion of the last section, we have
fˆR(0) = (n− k + 1)gmaxA ,
and
fˆNR(0) =
1
2
+ (n− k)gmaxA .
Therefore
fˆR(0)− fˆNR(0) = p(T = 1|GA = gA)
(
gmaxA −
1
2
)
> 0
which is strictly greater than zero and we are done.
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6.1.3 ng(k) < nl(k)
Considering terms corresponding to T = 0 we have
fˆR(0) = g
min
A +
1
2
(n− k),
and
fˆNR(0) =
1
2
(n− k + 1),
hence,
fˆNR(0)− fˆR(0) = p(T = 0|GA = gA)
(
1
2
− gminA
)
> 0
and we are done.
Proof of Lemma 1. First assume ng(k) < nl(k). Using Bayes rule we have
p(T = 1|θ)
p(T = 0|θ) =
p(T = 1|gA, ak−1, bk−1)
p(T = 0|gA, ak−1, bk−1) =
p(ak−1, bk−1|gA, T = 1)
p(ak−1, bk−1|gA, T = 0)
p(T = 1|gA)
p(T = 0|gA) . (50)
Now for t ∈ {0, 1} we have
p(ak−1, bk−1|gA, T = t) =
k−1∏
i=1
p(ai|gA, T = t, ai−1, bi−1)p(bi|gA, T = t, ai, bi−1).
Note that the term p(ai|gA, T = t, ai−1, bi−1) corresponding to Alice’s strategy is independent from the
value of t, since Alice only looks at gA and determines the number of gains and losses from the sequence
of actions to determine her action. Therefore
p(ak−1, bk−1|gA, T = 1)
p(ak−1, bk−1|gA, T = 0) =
∏k−1
i=1 p(bi|gA, T = 1, ai, bi−1)∏k−1
i=1 p(bi|gA, T = 0, ai, bi−1)
.
We know that when Alice plays R, Bob always plays S with probability 1−  and NS with probability .
As a result, in case T = 0, we can conclude that when Alice looses, Bob has played S. The number of
such stages is nl, contributing a term (1− )nl(k) to the probability. Furthermore, when Alice gains, Bob
has played NS which contributes a term ng(k). The case T = 1 is similar. Therefore∏k−1
i=1 p(bi|gA, T = 1, ai, bi−1)∏k−1
i=1 p(bi|gA, T = 0, ai, bi−1)
=
nl(k)(1− )ng(k)
ng(k)(1− )nl(k) .
Putting this into (50) and sending → 0 we get the desired result. The two other cases are similar.
6.2 Bob’s Information Sets
Assume an information set θ = (vB , a
k, bk−1) of Bob is given. If ak = NR, then Bob has no choice,
therefore assume that ak = R. We shall fix strategy S
 for all other information sets and find the optimal
strategy in θ. Such a strategy would be relevant only if we pass through θ. Upon reaching θ, Bob’s
strategy would be a combination of playing S and NS. However, following the same discussion we had for
Alice, since the resulting maximization is linear and hence could be restricted to pure strategies in this
information set, it suffices to show that the action given by strategy S in θ is optimal. Also, note that
since θ is given, Bob’s gains at stages 1 through k − 1 could be deterministically calculated. Therefore,
as before we only need to consider gains at stages k through n and show that playing selfishly is optimal.
In other words we should solve the following optimization problem
max
bk∈{S,NS}
ES
[GB (A[k:n], (bk, B[k+1:n])‖gB) |θ] , (51)
for small values of , whereAk = ak (since we have conditioned on θ) and the future actionsA[k+1:n], B[k+1:n]
follow then one given by S (i.e. S with probability 1−  and the other possible action with probability
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δ(1− )2, gmaxB
, 1/2
(1− ), gminB(1− ), gmaxB
1− , 1/2
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0 1-1-2-3
Figure 6: Auxiliary random walk for the case T = 1. Transition probabilities as well as Bob’s gain in
red are shown for two values of δ = 0 and δ = −2. Note that the values for δ ≥ 0 are identical to that of
δ = 0 and values for δ < 0 are all the same as δ = −2.
). We need to show that the answer to the above maximization problem is bk = S. In fact we should
compare the following two functions for small values of :
fX() = ES
[GB (A[k:n], (Bk = X,B[k+1:n])‖gB) |θ] , X ∈ {S,NS}. (52)
Note that we can expand
fX() = p(T = 0|θ)ES
[GB (A[k:n], (Bk = X,B[k+1:n])‖gB) |θ, T = 0]
+ p(T = 1|θ)ES
[GB (A[k:n], (Bk = X,B[k+1:n])‖gB) |θ, T = 1] , X ∈ {S,NS}.
Hence, it suffices to show that both conditioned on T = 0 and T = 1, S is dominant. In other words, if
we define
fX,t() = ES
[GB (A[k:n], (Bk = X,B[k+1:n])‖gB) |θ, T = t] , X ∈ {S,NS}, t ∈ {0, 1} (53)
we will show that for any value of T = t ∈ {0, 1} we have fS,t() ≥ fNS,t() for  sufficiently small.
6.2.1 Case T = 1: Showing that fS,1() ≥ fNS,1() for small 
Since T and gB are fixed, similar to Section 6.1 we can define ng and nl with respect to Alice at each
stage. It is more convenient to look at terms in (53) as a one dimensional random walk in the following
way. Note that at stage j, if we define δ(j) = ng(j)− nl(j) to be the difference between gains and losses
of Alice before stage j, action pair aj , bj will either add one unit to this value after playing at stage j,
subtract one unit or leave it unchanged. More precisely, if δ ≥ 0, there are three possible moves: (i)
aj = R, bj = S which increases δ by one (since T = 1) which is equivalent to one move to the right in the
random walk with probability (1− )2, this action has a gain of GmaxB for Bob, (ii) aj = R, bj = NS which
is equivalent to a left move with probability (1− ) and gain GminB and (iii) aj = NR which is equivalent
to no move with probability 1 −  and gain 1/2. Similarly one can define transition probabilities and
gains for δ < 0 which is depicted in Figure 6.
From now on, we shall continue our argument solely on this random walk. Define F 1δ,l() to be the
expected value of sum of the gains one would observe if he started at position δ and moved l times, which
is a polynomial in . Note that
fS,1() = g
max
A + F
1
δ(k)+1,n−k(),
and
fNS,1() = g
min
A + F
1
δ(k)−1,n−k().
Now we claim that for all values of , we have fR,1() ≥ fNR,1(), showing that playing R at this information
set is dominant. In order to show this, we use the idea of coupling in this random walk. When we choose
to play S at stage k, we move man number 1, say the selfish man, from position δ(k) to δ(k) + 1 and
from then on, he moves randomly n− k times. On the other hand, when we decide to play NS, we move
man number 2, say the non-selfish man, from position δ(k) to δ(k) − 1 and let him move n − k times.
Assume ∆S(j) for j > 0 be the position of the selfish man at stage k + j − 1; hence, ∆S(1) = δ(k) + 1
and ∆S(j) for j > 0 is a random variable. Define ∆NS(j) similarly for the non-selfish man. Also, ∆S(j)
is independent from ∆NS(k) since their moves are independent.
For each of the two men, X ∈ {S,NS}, defineMX(j) = ∆X(j)−∆X(j−1) with ∆S(0) = ∆NS(0) = δ(k)
to be their move at stage k+ j − 1, hence MX(j) ∈ {−1, 1, 0}. Note that since gmaxA + gminA = 1, for each
of the two men, gain at stage j is equal to
1
2
+MX(j)
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
.
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Therefore the overall gain in stages k through n would be
n−k+1∑
j=1
(
1
2
+MX(j)
(
gmaxB −
1
2
))
=
n− k + 1
2
+
(
gmaxB −
1
2
) n−k+1∑
j=1
MX(j)
=
n− k + 1
2
+
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
(∆X(n− k + 1)− δ(k)) X ∈ {S,NS},
and
fX() =
n− k + 1
2
− δ(k)
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
+ E [∆X(n− k + 1)]
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
X ∈ {S,NS}.
This suggests that the overall gain is only a function of the moves through the overall displacement at
stage n (i.e. the final location of the two men at the final stage). This is a result of the fact that the
average of gains of moving right and left in the random walk is equal to the gain of no move.
Now define ∆˜X(j) (X ∈ {S,NS}) to be the coupled placement of the two men as follows: The two
men move independently until the first time they reach the same node. From that point on, the two men
are coupled and forced to move together on the Markov chain (i.e. one of the men walks randomly on the
chain with the other man mimicking his moves). It is evident that the marginal distribution of ∆˜X(j) is
equal to the distribution of ∆X(j), since the two men are moving on the same random walk. Since the
non-selfish man starts to the left of the selfish man, i.e. ∆˜NS(1) = δ(k)− 1 < δ(k) + 1 = ∆˜S(1), and they
get coupled when they reach at the same node, the non-selfish man cannot go to the right of the selfish
man. In other words with probability one we have
∆˜NS(j) ≤ ∆˜S(j) 1 ≤ j ≤ n− k + 1. (54)
Therefore
fNS,1() =
n− k + 1
2
− δ(k)
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
+ E [∆NS(n− k + 1)]
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
=
n− k + 1
2
− δ(k)
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
+ E
[
∆˜NS(n− k + 1)
](
gmaxB −
1
2
)
(a)
≤ n− k + 1
2
− δ(k)
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
+ E
[
∆˜S(n− k + 1)
](
gmaxB −
1
2
)
=
n− k + 1
2
− δ(k)
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
+ E [∆S(n− k + 1)]
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
= fS,1(),
where (a) exploits equation (54) and the fact that gmaxB ≥ 1/2. This completes the proof for this case.
6.2.2 Case T = 0: Showing that fS,0() > fNS,0() for small 
Similar to the previous case, we can define a similar yet different random walk which is depicted in
Figure 7. F 0δ,l() is defined similarly. Quite similar to the previous case, consider selfish and non-selfish
men and denote their placement by ∆S(j) and ∆NS(j) for j > 0 and ∆S(0) = δNS(0) = δ(k). Also
∆S(1) = δ(k)− 1 and ∆NS(1) = δ(k) + 1. Furthermore define MX(j) = ∆X(j)−∆X(j − 1). Then gain
of max X at stage k + j − 1 is
1
2
+MX(j)
(
gminB −
1
2
)
.
It is easily verified that all expressions are similar to those of case T = 1 by substituting gmaxB with g
min
B ,
hence
fX,0() =
n− k + 1
2
− δ(k)
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
+ E [∆X(n− k + 1)]
(
gminB −
1
2
)
X ∈ {S,NS}.
Again, define ∆˜X(j) to be the coupled random variable representing coupled placement of the two men.
Since
∆˜S(1) = δ(k)− 1 ≤ δ(k) + 1 = ∆˜NS(1),
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Figure 7: Auxiliary random walk for the case T = 0. Transition probabilities as well as Bob’s gain in
red are shown for two values of δ = 0 and δ = −2. Note that the values for δ ≥ 0 are identical to that of
δ = 0 and values for δ < 0 are all the same as δ = −2.
therefore we have
∆˜S(j) ≤ ∆˜NS(j) 1 ≤ j ≤ n− k + 1. (55)
Using this and the fact that the marginal distribution of ∆˜X is equal to the distribution of ∆X , we have
fNS,0() =
n− k + 1
2
− δ(k)
(
gminB −
1
2
)
+ E [∆NS(n− k + 1)]
(
gminB −
1
2
)
=
n− k + 1
2
− δ(k)
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
+ E
[
∆˜NS(n− k + 1)
](
gminB −
1
2
)
(a)
≤ n− k + 1
2
− δ(k)
(
gmaxB −
1
2
)
+ E
[
∆˜S(n− k + 1)
](
gminB −
1
2
)
=
n− k + 1
2
− δ(k)
(
gminB −
1
2
)
+ E [∆S(n− k + 1)]
(
gminB −
1
2
)
= fS,0(),
where (a) exploits equation (55) and the fact that gminB ≤ 1/2. This completes the proof by showing that
playing S is dominant.
7 Proofs for Adjusted Winner
The division given by the AW algorithm are functions of algorithm’s inputs, a and b, when m = 2. In
this case, AWA (a, b) is a vector of length 2, say (d
A
1 , d
A
2 ), indicating the portion of goods given to Alice.
Similarly AWB (a, b) = (d
B
1 , d
B
2 ) denotes the portion of goods given to Bob. Since we divide the goods
between parties, dAi + d
B
i = 1, i = 1, 2. In the following, since we are interested in Alice’s gain, we use
AW (a, b) for AWA (a, b) unless otherwise stated. The following formulation for AW (a, b), as derived in
Section 7.1:
AW (a, b) =

(
0, 12−a−b
)
0 ≤ a ≤ min(1− b, b),(
1
a+b , 0
)
max(1− b, b) ≤ a ≤ 1,(
1, 1−a−b2−a−b
)
b < a < 1− b ∧ b ≤ 1/2,(
1− 1a+b , 1
)
1− b < a < b ∧ b > 1/2.
(56)
Definition 7. Alice’s gain when she announces valuation (a˜, 1− a˜) while her true valuation is (a, 1− a)
in the case that Bob’s true valuation is (b, 1− b) which is equal to his announced valuation is denoted by
Ψ (a˜, a‖b) which is equal to,
Ψ (a˜, a‖b) = AW (a˜, b) · (a, 1− a), (57)
where · is the inner product operation.
Using (56) we can write the exact expression of this function as we will see later. An example of Ψ is
presented in Figure 8.
In the case where b is uniformly distributed in [bmin, bmax], the gain associated with a˜ is an integral
with respect to b, which is discussed in the following definition.
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Figure 8: An example of Ψ as a function of a˜ for b = 0.3 and a = 0.1. Note the discontinuity of the
function at a˜ = b, its convexity in the intervals (0, b) and (1 − b, 1) and its concavity in the interval
(b, 1− b).
Definition 8. Alice’s expected gain when she announces valuation (a˜, 1− a˜) while her true valuation is
(a, 1−a) in the case that Bob’s true valuation is uniformly distributed in [bmin, bmax] and he acts honestly
is denoted by Ψ (a˜, a‖bmin, bmax) and is equal to,
Ψ (a˜, a‖bmin, bmax) = 1
bmax − bmin
∫ bmax
bmin
Ψ (a˜, a‖b) db. (58)
Note that a˜ and b are the two inputs to the Adjusted Winner algorithm. When we integrate over b,
at one point in the integration b = a˜. As is discussed in Section 7.1 in the case where the two inputs to
the Adjusted Winner algorithm are identical, there are two possible divisions of the cake as the output of
the algorithm. If both players had announced their valuations truly, these two divisions would give them
the same gains; however, in our scenario, Alice announces an untrue valuation. Thus, when a˜ = b, these
two valuations result in two different gains for Alice and the function under integration is not defined in
this one point. However, since the integral is not dependent on the value of one point, we can omit it.
Definition 9. The maximum expected value of Alice’s gain with above conditions is defined as,
Ψ∗ (a‖bmin, bmax) = max
0≤a˜≤1
Ψ (a˜, a‖bmin, bmax)
= max
bmin≤a˜≤bmax
Ψ (a˜, a‖bmin, bmax) .
(59)
The second line in (59) suggests that the optimum value of a˜ for Ψ falls in the interval [bmin, bmax]
which is justified in Corollary 1.
Definition 10. For a fixed value of Alice’s valuation, a, and Bob’s valuation b uniform in [bmin, bmax]
and a series of dividing points for k questions bmin = b0 ≤ · · · ≤ b2k = bmax, the improvement of Alice’s
gain by asking this set of questions is denoted by
∆k (b0, . . . , b2k) =
2k∑
i=1
bi − bi−1
b2k − b0
Ψ∗ (a‖bi−1, bi)−Ψ∗ (a‖bmin, bmax) . (60)
The maximum improvement by asking k questions is
∆∗k (bmin, bmax) = max
bmin=b0≤···≤b2k=bmax
∆k (b0, . . . , b2k) . (61)
Note that the term bi−bi−1b
2k
−b0 in (60) is the probability of the event b ∈ [bi−1, bi]; in fact, ∆k (b0, . . . , b2k)
is the expected value of Alice’s improvement in gain having the fact that b is uniformly distributed in
[bmin, bmax].
For the sake of simplicity we have assumed the maximums in Definitions 9 and 10 exist. One can
check that if we replace maximums by supremum and taking suboptimal points, the same results hold.
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Note that ∆∗ is defined on intervals. When we want to prove upper bounds on gain improvement, it
will be convenient to work with a special set of these functions, which we name interval concave. Note
that this terminology is not related to the concept of concavity and is used simply because the condition
has similarities to what we have for concave functions.
Definition 11. If M is the set of all pairs (x, y) ∈ R2 such that bmin ≤ x < y ≤ bmax, a function
∆ :M→ R is said to be interval concave in [bmin, bmax] if for all (x, y) ∈M and x ≤ t ≤ y we have,
t− x
y − x∆(x, t) +
y − t
y − x∆(t, y) ≤ ∆(x, y). (62)
Theorem 8. Assume a is fixed, b is uniformly distributed in [bmin, bmax] and we have an interval concave
∆˜ in [bmin, bmax] which is an upper bound for ∆
∗
1 in this interval, i.e.
∀x, y bmin ≤ x < y ≤ bmax ∆∗1 (x, y) ≤ ∆˜(x, y), (63)
then for all k ≥ 1 we have
∆∗k (bmin, bmax) ≤ k∆˜(bmin, bmax). (64)
The proof of the above theorem is given in Section 7.4. The proof of the other main theorems are
given in appendices 7.3 and 7.5.
7.1 Deriving Adjusted Winner formulation for two goods
When there are only two goods, by changing their ordering, we realize that AW (a, b), which is vector of
size 2, is the reverse of AW (1− a, 1− b). Therefore it suffices to analyze the case when b ≤ 1/2. We will
take three cases:
Case I, 0 ≤ a ≤ b: Since the valuation of Bob is more than Alice in the first good and the valuation
of Alice is more in the second good, the initial allocation is[
dA1 d
B
1
dA2 d
B
2
]
=
[
0 1
1 0
]
,
where Alice’s gain is 1− a and Bob’s is b. Since Alice’s gain is more, a portion of the second good should
be given to Bob. Solving the equations, the final allocation would be,[
0 1
1
2−a−b
1−a−b
2−a−b
]
,
It should be noted that in the case of a = b, there is no unique allocation, since in that case the initial
allocation is giving all the goods to Alice, but we can start with either the first good to give to Bob or
the second one, therefore any of the following allocations is feasible,[
0 1
1
2−2b
1−2b
2−2b
] [
1 0
1−2b
2−2b
1
2−2b
]
,
which give us exactly the same gain. We note that we would get the second allocation instead of the first
if we took the case of a = b in Case II (discussed below). Therefore the AW function is not well defined
when the valuations are identical.
Case II, b < a ≤ 1− b: the initial allocation is[
1 0
0 1
]
,
where Bob’s gain is 1− b which is greater than that of Alice which is a, therefore a portion of the second
good should be given to Alice. Solving for equality we get the following final allocation[
1 0
1−a−b
2−a−b
1
2−a−b
]
.
Case III, 1− b < a ≤ 1: the initial allocation is[
1 0
0 1
]
,
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where Alice’s gain is a which is greater than that of Bob which is 1 − b, therefore a portion of the first
good should be given to Bob. Solving for equality, the final allocation would be[
1
a+b 1− 1a+b
0 1
]
.
When b > 1/2, by considering AW (1− a, 1− b) and reversing the answer, we can find the allocation
in general:
AW (a, b) =

(
0, 12−a−b
)
a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ 1/2,(
1, 1−a−b2−a−b
)
b < a ≤ 1− b ∧ b ≤ 1/2,(
1
a+b , 0
)
1− b < a ≤ 1 ∧ b ≤ 1/2,(
1
a+b , 0
)
b ≤ a ≤ 1 ∧ b > 1/2,(
1− 1a+b , 1
)
1− b ≤ a < b ∧ b > 1/2,(
0, 12−a−b
)
a < 1− b ∧ b > 1/2.
(65)
Taking the similar terms together and neglecting the cases when a = b which is not well defined as
discussed before, we get the following simplified formulation:
AW (a, b) =

(
0, 12−a−b
)
0 ≤ a ≤ min(1− b, b),(
1
a+b , 0
)
max(1− b, b) ≤ a ≤ 1,(
1, 1−a−b2−a−b
)
b < a < 1− b ∧ b ≤ 1/2,(
1− 1a+b , 1
)
1− b < a < b ∧ b > 1/2.
(66)
Note that as discussed before, the special case when a = b does not result in a unique division, and we
have taken one of the possible cases. However, as we will see later, the case of a = b is not interesting for
us, therefore this conflict is acceptable for the purpose of our study.
An interesting fact is that, the four above cases are not independent. In fact the two following
equalities (which are true, even when m > 2) relate these four cases:
AW (1− (a, b)) = AW (a, b)r ,
AW ((a, b)r) = 1−AW (a, b) , (67)
where the reverse operator acts as (α, β)r = (β, α). Note that these are simply the case where the ordering
of players or the placement of items are altered.
7.2 Some lemmas
First we start by the following observation regarding the Ψ∗ function. The optimal value of a˜ when Alice
knows Bob’s valuation has been analyzed formerly, a discussion could be found in [5].
Proposition 1. Assume a and b are fixed. Then Ψ (a˜, a‖b) is a concave function of a˜ if min(b, 1− b) <
a˜ < max(b, 1 − b) and convex when a˜ < min(b, 1 − b) or a˜ > max(b, 1 − b). Also it is increasing when
a˜ < b and decreasing when a˜ > b. Furthermore,
sup
a˜
Ψ (a˜, a‖b) =

limx→b+ Ψ (x, a‖b) a > b,
limx→b− Ψ (x, a‖b) a < b,
Ψ (b, b‖b) a = b.
(68)
In fact this shows that if a > b, the optimal value of a˜ is b+ = b + , and when a < b, the optimal
value is a˜ = b− = b− . In fact in these two cases Ψ does not have a maximum. It should be noted that
the AW function is not well defined when a˜ = b and a 6= b.
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Proof. First we give the exact formulation of Ψ using (56) and Definition 7,
Ψ (a˜, a‖b) =

1−a
2−a˜−b 0 ≤ a˜ ≤ min(1− b, b),
a
a˜+b max(1− b, b) ≤ a˜ ≤ 1,
a+ (1− a) 1−a˜−b2−a˜−b b < a˜ < 1− b ∧ b ≤ 1/2,
1− aa˜+b 1− b < a˜ < b ∧ b > 1/2.
(69)
First assume b ≤ 1/2. In this case,
Ψ (a˜, a‖b) =

1−a
2−a˜−b 0 ≤ a˜ ≤ b,
a+ (1− a) 1−a˜−b2−a˜−b b < a˜ < 1− b,
a
a˜+b 1− b ≤ a˜ ≤ 1,
(70)
which is increasing in a˜ ≤ b, decreasing in b < a˜ < 1− b and 1− b ≤ a˜, also the limit of the second case
when a˜ goes to 1 − b from left is equal to a which is equal to the value of the third case for a˜ = 1 − b.
Therefore the function is continuous everywhere expect possibly in b. The left and right limits at b are
(1− a)/(2− 2b) and (1 + a− 2b)/(2− 2b) respectively. We see that the left limit is greater when a < b,
they are equal when a = b and the right limit is greater when b < a, which shows (68) in this special
case. The concave/convex statements are evident from the expression.
Now assume b > 1/2, we have,
Ψ (a˜, a‖b) =

1−a
2−a˜−b 0 ≤ a˜ ≤ 1− b,
1− aa˜+b 1− b < a˜ < b,
a
a˜+b b ≤ a˜ ≤ 1,
(71)
which is increasing in 0 ≤ a˜ ≤ 1− b and 1− b < a˜ < b and decreasing in b < a˜. The limit of the second
case and the value of the first case are both equal to 1− a at a˜ = 1− b, therefore the function is equal at
that point. The left and right limits at b are 1− a/2b and a/2b respectively, therefore left limit is greater
when b > a, the right limit is greater when b < a and they are equal when a = b, which again verifies
(68). Again, the concave/convex statement are evident from the expression.
Using this Proposition, we can conclude the following statement which justifies Definition 9.
Corollary 1. The optimum value for a˜ for Ψ (a˜, a‖bmin) bmax falls in [bmin, bmax], i.e.
max
0≤a˜≤1
Ψ (a˜, a‖bmin, bmax) = max
bmin≤a˜≤bmax
Ψ (a˜, a‖bmin, bmax) .
Proof. Assume a˜ /∈ [bmin, bmax]. First assume a˜ < bmin. As we have shown in Proposition 1, Ψ (a˜, a‖b) is
increasing in [a˜, b) for all b ∈ [bmin, bmax]. Therefore,
Ψ (a˜, a‖bmin, bmax) = 1
bmax − bmin
∫ bmax
bmin
Ψ (a˜, a‖b) db
<
1
bmax − bmin
∫ bmax
bmin
Ψ (bmin, a‖b) db
= Ψ (bmin, a‖bmin, bmax) ,
(72)
hence the maximum can not happen at this a˜. The proof for the case where a˜ > bmax is similar using the
fact that Ψ (a˜, a‖b) is decreasing in (b, a˜] for all b ∈ [bmin, bmax].
We expect that by asking a number of questions, the expected gain for Alice increases, and the more
questions she asks, the more is this improvement. The following proposition states this.
Proposition 2. Assume a is fixed and b is uniformly distributed in [bmin, bmax]. Then the sequence
∆∗k (bmin, bmax) for k ≥ 1 is nonnegative, nondecreasing and bounded by 1, i.e.
0 ≤ ∆∗1 ≤ ∆∗2 ≤ · · · ≤ 1. (73)
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7.3 Proof of Theorem 5
First we prove some tools. In this special case when 1/2 ≥ bmin, the integral in (58) could be computed
and the following properties could be easily derived by taking the first and second derivatives.
Lemma 2. If 1/2 ≤ bmin, then for bmin ≤ a˜ ≤ bmax we have,
Ψ (a˜, a‖bmin, bmax) =
a log
(
4a˜2
(a˜+bmax)(a˜+bmin)
)
− a˜+ bmax
bmax − bmin , (74)
is concave in a˜, therefore it has a unique maximum. Furthermore if a ≥ τu(bmin, bmax) then the derivative
is positive inside the interval and therefore the maximum happens at bmax and if a ≤ τl(bmin, bmax) the
derivative is negative inside the interval and therefore the maximum happens at bmin.
Proof. Using the expressions in (68), we have
Ψ (a˜, a‖bmin, bmax) = 1
bmax − bmin
∫ bmax
bmin
Ψ (a˜, a‖b) db
=
1
bmax − bmin
(∫ a˜
bmin
a
a˜+ x
dx+
∫ bmax
a˜
(
1− a
a˜+ x
)
dx
)
=
a log
(
4a˜2
(a˜+bmax)(a˜+bmin)
)
− a˜+ bmax
bmax − bmin .
(75)
Omitting the linear terms, we need to show that log
(
a˜2
(a˜+bmin)(a˜+bmax)
)
is concave in a˜, the second
derivative is equal to
1
(bmin + a˜)2
+
1
(bmax + a˜)2
− 2
a˜2
=
(
1
(bmin + a˜)2
− 1
a˜2
)
+
(
1
(bmax + a˜)2
− 1
a˜2
)
≤ 0,
(76)
which shows the concavity.
Now assume that a ≥ τu. Since the function is concave, it suffices to show that the derivative is
positive at a˜ = bmax. The first derivative is equal to,
a˜(a˜+bmax)−2abmax
a˜(bmin−bmax) − aa˜+bmin
a˜+ bmax
. (77)
Substituting a˜ = bmax,
−2bmax(bmax + bmin) + a(bmax + 3bmin)
2bmax(b2max − b2min)
. (78)
Note that the denominator is positive since bmax > bmin > 0, therefore expression is greater than or equal
to zero if and only if a ≥ τu. For the second case, again since the function is concave, in order to show
that the maximum happens at bmin, it suffices to check the derivative at a˜ = bmin which is equal to,
a(3bmax + bmin)− 2bmaxbmin − 2b2min
2bmin(b2max − b2min)
. (79)
Again since the denominator is positive, the first derivative is less than or equal to zero if and only if
a ≤ τl.
Lemma 3. (a) If 1/2 ≤ bmin < bmax ≤ 1, the thresholds τl and τu satisfy
τl ≤ bmin ≤ bmax ≤ τu, (80)
(b) If [b0, b1] is a subinterval of [bmin, bmax], i.e. bmin ≤ b0 and b1 ≤ bmax, then
τl(bmin, bmax) ≤ τl(b0, b1) ≤ τu(b0, b1) ≤ τu(bmin, bmax). (81)
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Proof. If s denotes the ratio of endpoints, bmax/bmin, we see that,
τu = bmax
2(s+ 1)
s+ 3
,
τl = bmin
2(s+ 1)
3s+ 1
.
(82)
For part (a), note that 2(s + 1)/(s + 3) ≥ 1 for s ≥ 1. Since s = bmax/bmin ≥ 1 and τu ≥ bmax.
Similarly, for s ≥ 1, 2(s+ 1)/(3s+ 1) ≤ 1 which shows that τl ≤ bmin.
For the second part, if s′ denotes b1/b0, we have b1 ≤ bmax and s′ < s, therefore (82) and the fact
that the function 2(s + 1)/(s + 3) is increasing show that τu(b0, b1) ≤ τu(bmin, bmax). Similarly, since
bmin ≤ b0 and the function 2(s+ 1)/(3s+ 1) is decreasing, τl(b0, b1) ≥ τl(bmin, bmax)
The following Lemma gives a simple expression for Ψ∗ in this special case.
Lemma 4. With conditions of Theorem 5, we have the following formulation for Ψ∗,
Ψ∗ (a‖bmin, bmax) =

a log
(
2bmax
bmax+bmin
)
bmax−bmin a ≥ τu,
a log
(
2bmin
bmax+bmin
)
bmax−bmin + 1 a ≤ τl.
(83)
Proof. As we have shown before, Ψ (a˜, a‖bmin, bmax) is differentiable and concave in a˜, therefore its max-
imum value either happens at endpoints or could be obtained by setting its derivative equal to zero.
However, since the function is concave, the maximum happens at bmax if and only if the derivative is
nonnegative entirely in the interval, which reduces to the condition that the derivative is nonnegative
at bmax. Simplifying this condition, we realize that this happens when a ≥ τu, therefore substituting
a˜ = bmax we get the expression for the first case. Using a similar method and by setting the derivative
at bmin to be less than or equal to zero, we get the second case.
In the next Lemma, we derive the exact form of ∆∗k.
Lemma 5. For a and [bmin, bmax] fixed, the geometric sequence bˆ0, . . . , bˆ2k where bˆ0 = bmin, bˆ2k = bmax
and
log bˆi =
(
1− i
2k
)
log bˆ0 +
i
2k
log bˆ2k 1 < i < 2
k, (84)
maximizes ∆∗k (bmin, bmax).
Proof. We will take two cases, a ≥ τu or a ≤ τl. First assume that a ≥ τu. Using Lemma 4 we have,
∆k (b0, . . . , b2k) =
2k∑
i=1
bi − bi−1
b2k − b0
Ψ∗ (a‖bi−1, bi)−Ψ∗ (a‖b0, b2k)
=
2k∑
i=1
a log
(
2bi
bi+bi−1
)
b2k − b0
−
a log
(
2b
2k
b
2k
+b0
)
b2k − b0
,
(85)
where the last equality holds since [bi−1, bi] is a subinterval of [bmin, bmax] and hence using Lemma 3,
a ≥ τu(bi−1, b0). Note that a, b0 and b2k are constant, therefore by defining si = bi/bi−1 we should
maximize the following,
2k∑
i=1
log
(
2bi
bi + bi−1
)
=
2k∑
i=1
log
(
2
1 + 1si
)
= log
2k∏
i=1
2
1 + 1si
. (86)
Since log is increasing, in order to maximize this, we need to minimize α where,
α =
2k∏
i=1
(
1 +
1
si
)
. (87)
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If we define sˆi = bˆi/bˆi−1, since bˆi is a geometric sequence,
sˆi =
(
bmax
bmin
)1/2k
. (88)
Now define ρi = log si and ρˆi = log sˆi. Note that ρˆi is a constant sequence. In fact, since
∏
si =
∏
sˆi =
bmax/bmin,
∑
ρi =
∑
ρˆi = log bmax − log bmin. Also bˆi is geometric, hence for all 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k
ρˆj =
log bmax − log bmin
2k
=
∑2k
i=1 ρi
2k
. (89)
Now, by defining f(x) = log(1 + e−x) which is convex,
logα =
2k∑
i=1
log
(
1 +
1
si
)
=
2k∑
i=1
log (1 + exp(−ρi)) =
2k∑
i=1
f(ρi)
(a)
≥ 2kf
(∑2k
i=1 ρi
2k
)
(b)
= 2kf
(∑2k
i=1 ρˆi
2k
)
(c)
=
2k∑
i=1
f(ρˆi),
(90)
where (a) uses Jensen’s inequality and the fact that f(x) is convex, (b) uses (89) and (c) uses the fact
that ρˆi is a constant sequence. Thus bˆi minimizes α or equivalently maximizes ∆k.
Now consider he case where a ≤ τl. In this case we have,
∆k (b0, . . . , b2k) =
2k∑
i=1
bi − bi−1
b2k − b0
Ψ∗ (a‖bi−1, bi) ,−Ψ∗ (a‖b0, b2k)
=
2k∑
i=1
bi − bi−1
b2k − b0
a log
(
2bi−1
bi+bi−1
)
bi − bi−1 + 1
−
a log
(
2b0
b
2k
+b0
)
b2k − b0
+ 1

=
2k∑
i=1
a log
(
2bi−1
bi+bi−1
)
b2k − b0
−
a log
(
2b0
b
2k
+b0
)
b2k − b0
,
(91)
where again we have used Lemma 3 which guarantees that a ≤ τl(bi−1, bi). Omitting the constant terms,
we should maximize ∑
log
2bi−1
bi + bi−1
= log
∏ 2
1 + si
. (92)
Since log is increasing, we should minimize β =
∏2k
i=1 1 + si. By defining g(x) = f(−x) = log (1 + ex)
which is convex, we have
log β =
2k∑
i=1
log (1 + si) =
2k∑
i=1
log (1 + exp(ρi)) =
2k∑
i=1
g(ρi)
(a)
≥ 2kg
(∑2k
i=1 ρi
2k
)
(b)
= 2kg
(∑2k
i=1 ρˆi
2k
)
(c)
=
2k∑
i=1
g(ρˆi),
(93)
where (a) uses Jensen’s inequality and convexity of g, (b) uses (89) and (c) uses the fact that ρˆi is a
constant sequence. Thus bˆi minimizes β or equivalently maximizes ∆k.
Remark 6. Note that this lemma shows that the optimal series of divisions for k questions is exactly
the same for that of k − 1 questions together with the optimal dividing question for each of the 2k−1
subintervals.
Lemma 6. If a /∈ [τl(bmin, bmax), τu(bmin, bmax)], then ∆∗1 is interval concave.
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Proof. Assume b0 ≥ bmin and b2 ≤ bmax, as a result of Lemma 3 part (b), a /∈ [τl(b0, b2), τu(b0, b2)]. We
can derive the formulation for ∆2. Using Lemma 4, for the case of a ≤ τl:
∆1 (b0, b1, b2) =
2∑
i=1
bi − bi−1
b2 − b0 Ψ
∗ (a‖bi−1, bi)−Ψ∗ (a‖b0, b2)
=
2∑
i=1
a log
(
2bi−1
bi+bi−1
)
b2 − b0 −
a log
(
2b0
b2+b0
)
b2 − b0
=
a log
(
2b1(b2+b0)
(b1+b2)(b1+b0)
)
b2 − b0 .
(94)
Similarly, for the case of a ≥ τu:
∆1 (b0, b1, b2) =
2∑
i=1
bi − bi−1
b2 − b0 Ψ
∗ (a‖bi−1, bi)−Ψ∗ (a‖b0, b2)
=
2∑
i=1
a log
(
2bi
bi+bi−1
)
b2 − b0 −
a log
(
2b2
b2+b0
)
b2 − b0
=
a log
(
2b1(b2+b0)
(b1+b2)(b1+b0)
)
b2 − b0 .
(95)
We observe that ∆1 (b0, b1, b2) is the same in the two cases. Using Lemma 5 and substituting b1 =
√
b0b2,
∆∗1 (b0, b2) =
a log
(
2(b2+b0)
(
√
b2+
√
b0)
2
)
b2 − b0 . (96)
By defining s =
√
b2/b0, the ratio of interval endpoints, we can rewrite ∆
∗
2 in the following form,
∆∗1 (b0, b2) =
a
b0
log
(
(s−1)2
(s+1)2
+ 1
)
s2 − 1 . (97)
We show that if b0 ≤ b1 ≤ b2, then ∆∗1 (b0, b1) ≤ ∆∗1 (b0, b2) and ∆∗1 (b1, b2) ≤ ∆∗1 (b0, b2) which is
sufficient for a function to be interval concave. Note that the first term in (97), a/b0, is decreasing in b0,
thus it suffices to show that f(s) defined as,
f(s) =
log
(
(s−1)2
(s+1)2
+ 1
)
s2 − 1 , (98)
is increasing in s when 1 ≤ s ≤ √2 (s is the square root of the ratio of bmax and bmin and hence is greater
than 1, also bmax/bmax is at most 2, since bmin ≥ 1/2 and bmax ≤ 1). Monotonicity of f could be shown
analytically. Its plot is provided in Figure 9.
Now we have sufficient tools to prove Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 5. For the sake of simplicity, we use ∆∗k to denote ∆
∗
k (bmin, bmax). For proving the
concavity of the sequence, it suffices to prove that for k ≥ 2,
∆∗k −∆∗k−1 ≥ ∆∗k−1 −∆∗k−2, (99)
where ∆∗0 is defined to be 0. Assume b0, . . . , b2k is the sequence given by Lemma 5 which maximize ∆k.
Note that since the sequence is geometric, the sequence bi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 2k, i ≡ 0 (mod 2) is the sequence
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Figure 9: The plot of f(s) as defined in (98) for 1 ≤ s ≤ √2
maximizing ∆k−1 and also the sequence bi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 2k, i ≡ 0 (mod 4) maximizes ∆k−2. Hence,
∆∗k =
2k∑
i=1
bi − bi−1
b2k − b0
Ψ∗ (a‖bi−1, bi)−Ψ∗ (a‖b0, b2k) ,
∆∗k−1 =
2k∑
i=1
2|i
bi − bi−2
b2k − b0
Ψ∗ (a‖bi−2, bi)−Ψ∗ (a‖b0, b2k) ,
∆∗k−2 =
2k∑
i=1
4|i
bi − bi−4
b2k − b0
Ψ∗ (a‖bi−4, bi)−Ψ∗ (a‖b0, b2k) .
(100)
Note that when k = 2 the last equality reduces to ∆∗0 = 0 which is consistent with our definition.
Subtracting ∆∗k−1 from ∆
∗
k and simplifying,
∆∗k −∆∗k−1 =
2k∑
i=1
2|i
bi − bi−2
b2k − b0
∆1 (bi−2, bi−1, bi)
=
2k∑
i=1
2|i
bi − bi−2
b2k − b0
∆∗1 (bi−2, bi) ,
(101)
where we have used the fact that since bi is geometric, bi−1 =
√
bibi−2. Similarly,
∆∗k−1 −∆∗k−2 =
2k∑
i=1
4|i
bi − bi−4
b2k − b0
∆∗1 (bi−4, bi) . (102)
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Now,
∆∗k −∆∗k−1 =
2k∑
i=1
2|i
bi − bi−2
b2k − b0
∆∗1 (bi−2, bi)
=
2k∑
i=1
4|i
bi−2 − bi−4
b2k − b0
∆∗1 (bi−4, bi−2) +
bi − bi−2
b2k − b0
∆∗1 (bi−2, bi)
=
2k∑
i=1
4|i
bi − bi−4
b2k − b0
(
bi−2 − bi−4
bi − bi−4 ∆
∗
1 (bi−4, bi−2) +
bi − bi−2
bi − bi−4 ∆
∗
1 (bi−2, bi)
)
≤
2k∑
i=1
4|i
bi − bi−4
b2k − b0
∆∗1 (bi−4, bi) = ∆
∗
k−1 −∆∗k−2,
(103)
where we have used the fact from Lemma 6 that ∆∗1 is interval concave.
7.4 Proof of Theorem 8
Proof of Theorem 8. We prove this by induction. In fact we prove a stronger statement; we claim that
for all k ≥ 1 and b0, b2k such that bmin ≤ b0 < b2k ≤ bmax,
∆∗k (b0, b2k) ≤ k∆˜(b0, b2k), (104)
which reduces to what we expect by substituting b0 = bmin and b2k = bmax. Note that for k = 1 this
reduces to (63) which is assumed to be true. Now assume it is true for k − 1. If b1, . . . , b2k−1 are the
divisions which maximize ∆∗k (b0, b2k), we have:
∆∗k (b0, b2k) = ∆k (b0, b1, . . . , b2k)
=
2k∑
i=1
bi − bi−1
b2k − b0
Ψ∗ (a‖bi−1, bi)−Ψ∗ (a‖bmin, bmax)
=
b2k−1 − b0
b2k − b0
∆k−1 (b0, . . . , b2k−1) +
b2k − b2k−1
b2k − b0
∆k−1 (b2k−1 , . . . , b2k)
+
b2k−1 − b0
b2k − b0
Ψ∗ (a‖b0, b2k−1) +
b2k − b2k−1
b2k − b0
Ψ∗ (a‖b2k−1 , b2k)
−Ψ∗ (a‖b0, b2k)
=
b2k−1 − b0
b2k − b0
∆k−1 (b0, . . . , b2k−1) +
b2k − b2k−1
b2k − b0
∆k−1 (b2k−1 , . . . , b2k)
+ ∆1 (b0, b2k−1 , b2k)
≤ b2k−1 − b0
b2k − b0
∆∗k−1 (b0, b2k−1) +
b2k − b2k−1
b2k − b0
∆∗k−1 (b2k−1 , b2k)
+ ∆∗1 (b0, b2k) .
(105)
Now by using the induction hypothesis
∆∗k (b0, b2k) ≤ (k − 1)
(
b2k−1 − b0
b2k − b0
∆˜(b0, b2k−1) +
b2k − b2k−1
b2k − b0
∆˜(b2k−1 , b2k)
)
+ ∆˜(b0, b2k).
(106)
Since ∆˜ is interval concave, we have ∆∗k (b0, b2k) ≤ k∆˜(b0, b2k).
7.5 Proof of Theorem 6
Using Theorem 8, it suffices to prove the following theorem:
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Theorem 9. Assume that for bmin ≤ x < y ≤ bmax, ∆∗1 (x, y) is differentiable with respect to y. Then
∆˜(x, y) defined by
∆˜(x, y) = max
x≤γ1≤γ2≤y
Λ(γ1, γ2), (107)
where Λ(x, y) = ∂∂yΓ(x, y) defined as follows
Γ(x, y) =
{
(y − x)∆∗1 (x, y) y > x,
0 y = x,
(108)
is an interval concave upper bound for ∆∗1.
Proof of Theorem 9. We know from Proposition 2 that ∆∗1 is bounded, therefore Γ is continuous at x = y.
Furthermore, since ∆∗1 is differentiable with respect to y, for a fixed x, it is continuous with respect to
y. Therefore for b > a, Γ(a, y) is continuous when y changes in [a, b] and differentiable in (a, b) as ∆∗1 is.
Using mean value theorem, there exists a y∗ ∈ (a, b) where
Γ(a, b) = (b− a) ∂
∂y
Γ(a, y∗). (109)
Now by the definition of ∆˜,
(b− a)∆∗1 (a, b) = Γ(a, b) = (b− a)
∂
∂y
Γ(a, y∗) ≤ (b− a)∆˜(a, b), (110)
hence for any a < b, ∆∗1 (a, b) ≤ ∆˜(a, b) and therefore ∆˜ is an upper bound on ∆∗1.
It only remains to prove that it is interval concave. Note that if x ≤ t ≤ y, then
∆˜(x, t) = max
x≤γ1≤γ2≤t
∂
∂y
Γ(γ1, γ2) ≤ max
x≤γ1≤γ2≤y
∂
∂y
Γ(γ1, γ2) = ∆˜(x, y), (111)
likewise,
∆˜(t, y) = max
t≤γ1≤γ2≤y
∂
∂y
Γ(γ1, γ2) ≤ max
x≤γ1≤γ2≤y
∂
∂y
Γ(γ1, γ2) = ∆˜(x, y), (112)
therefore,
t− x
y − x∆˜(x, t) +
y − t
y − x∆˜(t, y) ≤ ∆˜(x, y), (113)
which shows that ∆˜ is interval concave.
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